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ARTICLES 
TOWARD UNIFYING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN 
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 
GEORGE W. DENT, JR.* 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published the seminal book, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. This work set forth the thesis that corpo-
. rate law's central dilemma has been the separation of ownership and control in pub-
licly held corporations. Over the years, the Berle-Means thesis has been tossed aside 
by critics who argue that economic forces compel managers to act as if the sharehold-
ers were in control and by those who welcome the idea that managers are able to 
exercise their more enlightened ·business acumen. On the other hand, those who share 
concerns over the separation of ownership and control have had little luck in getting 
anything done to bridge this gap. 
In this Article, Professor Dent seeks to rejuvenate the debate over the separa-
tion of ownership and control. To this end, he proposes a theoretically simple, yet 
realistic and quite workable solution to this dilemma: take away managements' con-
trol of the proxy voting system and give control to the publicly held corporations' 
largest shareholders. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property1 in 1932, corporate law's central di-
lemma has been the separation of ownership and control in public cor-
porations. On one side are shareholders, the ostensible owners; on the 
other side are corporate officers, the shareholders' ostensible fiduci-
aries. Between them is a black hole:· the board of directors. In tradi-
tional legal theory, the shareholders select the board, which manages 
the corporation. Berle and Means, however, showed that in an increas-
ing number of large companies, management was not chosen by share-
holders, but was a self-perpetuating oligarchy. 
Some deny that the Berle-Means thesis is significant; even if share-
holders do not control corporate managers exactly as traditional theory 
posits, economic forces compel managers to behave as if they were so 
controlled. Others accept and welcome the Berle-Means thesis, pro-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Bernard Black, Peter Carstensen, Ronald 
Coffey, Alfred Conard, Tamar Frankel, Robert Hamilton, Dennis Karjala, William LaPiana, 
Louis Lowenstein, Jonathan Macey, Robert Monks, E. Donald Shapiro and William Wang for 
their helpful comments. 
I. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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claiming that managers exercise more enlightened control of huge cor-
porations than would investors. Most observers, however, concede that 
the separation of ownership and control leads to economic inefficiency 
and mistreatment of shareholders. To remedy these problems, innu-
merable proposals have been floated to reform corporate governance. 
The central battleground in the corporate governance debate is cur-
rently the American Law Institute's (ALI) Corporate Governance 
Project. 2 This battle has now deteriorated into trench warfare, with 
proponents and critics battling over such trivia as the difference be-
tween a "reasonable" and a "rational" standard of care. 3 
The ALI Project and the monitoring model of corporate govern-
ance it embraces have much to offer corporate law. Critics, however, 
level many weighty arguments against them. More important, even the 
Project's champions do not hail it as a panacea. The fatal flaw of the 
ALI Project and other reform efforts is their failure to remedy the sepa-
ration of ownership and control. The ALI's reporters would activate 
outside directors to serve shareholder interests by assigning them duties 
backed by the threat oflegal sanctions. Unfortunately, legal sanctions 
are at best a clumsy substitute for self-interest. Criticism of the ALI 
Project may therefore be well-founded. Rejecting the ALI proposals, 
however, merely returns us to the status quo: the law of corporate gov-
ernance focused on a board of directors that does not, and apparently 
cannot, perform any significant function. 
This Article seeks to hurdle this increasingly sterile debate and find 
new solutions to the corporate governance problem. In short, separa-
tion of ownership and control stems from management's domination of 
proxy voting. Although commentators recognize this, most accept it as 
inevitable; shareholders are too numerous, scattered and indifferent to 
coordinate their voting. So long as management controls proxies, cor-
porate governance reform efforts are doomed. An effective shareholder 
franchise, however, would remedy the separation of ownership and 
control and, with it, most other corporate governance problems. This 
Article analyzes the corporate governance impasse and proposes to 
unite ownership and control by transferring control of proxy solicita-
tions to a committee of a corporation's largest shareholders. The Arti-
cle concludes that such a change would ameliorate or eliminate many of 
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
REcoMMENDATIONS [hereinafter ALI PROJECT]. Tentative drafts covering several parts of the pro-
posed principles have been approved by the ALI members. Approval of the entire proposal is not 
expected for several years. 
3. ALI PROJECT§ 4.01(c) comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985); Manning, A 
Chat With a Martian, N. Y.L.J., May 26, 1988, at 5, col. 1 ("[P]articipants often display passionate 
preference for one articulation of principle and outraged rejection of another which to onlook-
ers-and later generations-look much the same"). 
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the gravest problems of corporate law relating to tender offers, ineffec-
tive boards of directors, skewed executive compensation, shareholder 
derivative suits, and de-equitization. 
II. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A TAXONOMY OF 
CORPORATE THEORY 
A. The Berle-Means Thesis 
Corporate law has long provided that shareholders, the real own-
ers of the firm, choose a board of directors to "direct" their business.4 
Because shareholders could select the directors, it was presumed that 
the board would serve shareholder interests by maximizing firm profits; 
indeed, the law obliged directors to do so. 5 The board designates of-
ficers to "act as agents .of the board and execute its decisions. " 6 In this 
"received legal model, " 7 ownership and control are not materially sep-
arated; the officers are subservient to the directors and the directors are 
responsible to the shareholders. 
Berle and Means demolished this theory. They argued that in large 
public companies, managers had seized control from the shareholders, 
the ostensible owners. 8 Their insight was not original, 9 but Berle and 
Means, addressing a public receptive because of the stock market crash 
and the onset of the Depression, made it an axiom of corporate theory. 
Separation, they posited, resulted not from a conspiracy of managers, 
but from the pattern of stock ownership in public companies. Each 
shareholder owned few shares and lacked the means or inclination to 
participate actively in electing directors. The managers, who had both 
4. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION] (1976). The classic statutory 
formulation was that "the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors." 
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 137 (5th ed. 1980). This 
requirement, which is not inevitable, seems to have grown out of practice and has not been univer-
sal. From 1862 to 1929, British law did not require a board. Kessler, The Statutory Requiren'ient of 
a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 703-04 (1960). Many state 
statutes now permit closely held corporations to eliminate the board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 351 (1983). 
5. R. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAw 679 (1986). In general, directors who fail to maximize 
profits are liable for breach of fiduciary duty. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS 621-63 (3d ed. 1983). Some limited exceptions are permitted, such as charitable contribu-
tions. See id. at 474-76. 
6. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at I. 
7. The phrase is Professor Eisenberg's. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at I. 
8. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note I, at 4-5, 84, 86-88, 114. 
9. Adam Smith first noted the phenomenon of managerial seizure of corporate control. 
A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (E. Cannan 
ed. 1966). See also The Separation of Ownership and Management, in R. BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL 
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT {1925); T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 157, 174-
75 {1904). 
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means and motive, easily induced shareholders to elect a board sub-
servient to the managers. 10 The directors, qua directors, did not di-
rect. 11 Thus were ownership and control separated. 
Berle and Means precipitated what remains the central contro-
versy in corporate law. 12 Their thesis suggested that managers enjoy 
broad discretion in running public companies. Unconstrained by share-
holders' demands for maximum profits, managers might be lazy or di-
vert profits from shareholders to others, principally themselves. 13 This 
implied that economic production was inefficient. 14 It also implied that 
investors were being mistreated, which not only was unfair, but also 
meant that capital markets were inefficient. 15 Corporate law theory has 
since grappled with this problem, producing three kinds of responses: 
one denies that corporate managers have significant discretion; a sec-
ond concedes discretion and applauds it; and a third concedes discre-
tion but deplores it, and seeks to eliminate discretion by reforming cor-
porate governance. 
B. Rejecting the Separation Hypothesis: Executive Groups and 
Neoclassicists 
Some commentators deny any significance to the Berle-Means the-
sis of separation and managerial discretion. These critics fall generally 
into two schools: business executives and neoclassical economists. The 
former group is represented by the Business Roundtable, 16 corporate 
lawyers and a few academics whosebattle cry is: "If it ain't broke, don't 
fix it." In their view, separation of ownership and control, if it exists at 
all, has not impaired corporate performance; American companies are 
10. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note I, at 4, 47-63, 84-89. 
II. Although Berte and Means did not expressly make this point, it was consistent with 
their theory and had been noted before they wrote that non-officer d_irectors, or outside directors, 
did not control management. Since the start of this century, critics have bewailed ineffectual direc-
tors. See Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (i907). See also Note, Liability 
of the Inactive Corporate Direc!Or, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 18 (1908). Directors who are also officers, 
inside directors, are effective, but as officers rather than as directors. Outside directors were, and 
still are, ineffective. See infra text accompanying notes 89-110, 118-19. 
12. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. I, 15 (1986). To celebrate the 50th anniversary of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, the Hoover Institution sponsored a conference on the continuing debate over the book. 
See Conference: Corporations and Private Property, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 235-496 (1983). 
13. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note I, at 7, 119-25,222-27 & 230-35 (discussing self-
dealing and inside trading). 
14. !d. at 8-9. 
15. If managers are free to shirk responsibility and divert profits, investors will be loathe 
to purchase corporate shares, and there will be sub-optimal investment in stock. See infra notes 
173-74. 
16. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRO-
POSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS" (1983) (hereinafter BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT). 
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soundly managed. Reformers, they claim; misread corporate actions by 
viewing them with hindsight and ascribing all unsuccessful risk-taking 
to managerial mistakes. They portray corporate executives not as en-
joying the broad discretion and carefree existence suggested by Berle 
and Means, but rather as beleaguered by powerful interests, including 
labor, suppliers, consumers, political activists and government bureau-
crats. They argue that few managers shirk responsibility or divert prof-
its, that managers who do so are usually punished or fired by fellow 
managers, and that outside directors furnish further discipline in the 
rare cases where it is needed. 
The second group that belittles the Berle-Means thesis consists of 
neoclassical economists. While conceding that shareholders rubber 
stamp managements' board nominees, they claim that economic forces 
compel managers to maximize profits 1 7 as shareholders would if they 
controlled the firm. As a corollary, they posit evolution of corporate 
forms through survival of the fittest: "[a]bsent fiat, the form of organ-
ization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product 
demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs." 18 
Thus, "there is no systematic defect in corporate governance." 19 Prod-
uct and capital markets, they claim, provide restraint. So do managers' 
compensation schedules: by basing compensation on performance, cor-
porations motivate managers to maximize profits, or share value. Most 
important are corporate takeovers; mangers who let profits dwindle in-
vite a takeover by a corporate raider who will oust them. 20 
17. "Maximization of profits" does not adequately describe the firm's goals because it 
fails to distinguish between the short and long term, or to suggest how future profits are to be 
discounted to present value. "Maximization of share value" is sometimes used to overcome these 
problems. 
18. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 301, 301 
(1983). See also Easterbrook & F!schel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395,416,418-19 
(1983) (the most efficient corporate law rules, including proxy rules, "survive"). 
19. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1260 (1982). 
See a/soN. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS VERSUS REGULATION (1984); 
Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI Project and the 
Independent Director, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 557, 560-66 (1984); Demsetz, The MoniLOring of 
Management, in BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 16, at B-1, B-6 ("The board of 
directors can do very little to improve on the powerful incentives that presently guide management 
to serve the interests of shareholder."); Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A 
Reappraisal, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 273, 285-89 ( 1983). These commentators do not claim that corporate 
governance is now perfect. Rather, they believe that "marginal conditions prevail, and we there-
fore observe monitoring and bonding by officers, directors and shareholders until the marginal 
cost of an additional increment of monitoring just equals the expected marginal benefits." Letter 
from Professor Jonathan R. Macey to George W. Dent, Jr., Feb_ 8, 1989 (on file with the Wiscon-
sin Law Review) [hereinafter Macey Letter]. 
20. The seminal work is Manne, Mergers and the Markel for Corporate Contra/, 73 J. 
PoL. ECON. 110 (1965). See also Jensen & Ruback, The Market far Corporate Control: The Scien-
tific E1•idence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). 
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Defenders of the status quo are right that reformers often exagger-
ate corporate deficiencies; most American corporations have per-
formed fairly well. Most corporate managers and outside directors are 
competent, attentive and honest. Nonetheless, the Panglossian compla-
cency of "If it ain't broke" is unjustified. Among managers, as in any 
group, some are incompetent, lazy or venal, and even an adequate man-
ager is not necessarily the best person available. More important, 
human nature dictates that most people, managers included, cannot be 
objective when their own interests are at stake; no one can be her own 
judge. Finally, outside directors do not effectively constrain 
management. 21 
Economic constraints do not close the gap created by the ineffec-
tive board. Product markets discipline managers only by threatening 
bankruptcy. Even in a competitive industry, however, a firm may sur-
vive indefinitely with a venal or incompetent management. If profits 
shrink, shareholders, the tax man, employees and creditors bear much 
of the loss. 22 Bankruptcy will not scare managers who can maintain 
control or retire. Even when bankruptcy does discipline managers, it 
does so only at great costs to investors, employees and others. 
Compensation schedules discipline managers only if they are tied 
to the managers' performance. Even when well designed, compensation 
is an imperfect motivator because managers get only a tiny fraction of 
their labors' benefits. 23 Moreover, compensation schedules are difficult 
to design. It is hard to observe and measure a manager's individual 
performance; therefore, some measure of firm performance, such as 
earnings or stock appreciation, is generally substituted. 24 These, how-
ever, reflect many forces other than the efforts of one officer or all of-
ficers together. Because managers are risk averse, 25 incentive compen-
sation may even backfire. Managers may shun risks attractive to 
shareholders and pursue steady, albeit modest, returns that will assure 
steady compensation. If their compensation were fixed, managers 
might be more willing to undertake greater risks. 26 Finally, compensa-
2!. See infra text accompanying notes 89-110, 118-19. 
22. Lower profits reduce income taxes at both the corporate and shareholder level. Be-
cause labor markets are not perfect and frictionless, employees may accept lower compensation 
from an unprofitable firm. Creditors may accept less than full payment in a voluntary reorganiza-
tion, rather than force the company into a lengthy, costly bankruptcy. 
23. See infra note 165. 
24. For example, many firms give bonuses based on earnings, stock options and stock 
appreciation rights, which reward officers based on appreciation of the firm's stock. SeeR. CLARK, 
supra note 5, at 201-19. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 45-52. 
26. Coffee, supra note 12, at 18,24 (compensation tied to firm performance makes man-
agers more risk averse); Carlton & Fischel, The Regula/ion of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 
857,869, 875-76 (1983). 
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tion does not discipline effectively because managers can shape their 
compensation schedules to their own benefit. 2 7 
Capital markets discipline managers only when they need outside 
funds. Most companies can survive and even grow with internally gen-
erated capital; managers of public companies are almost obsessive 
about retaining earnings. 28 Even when necessary, outside financing 
does not fully constrain managers. For debt financing, lenders care only 
whether the firm can pay principal and interest when due; they care 
little whether the firm maximizes profits, and they even share the man-
agers' distaste for risks that might appeal to shareholders. 29 New equity 
financing by public companies is extremely rare and does not constrain 
managers; if firm profits are low, the price of the new stock will also be 
low, but that has little effect on managers. 30 Neoclassical economist 
posit that if profits ebb because of managerial dishonesty or slack, the 
firm's share price will fall. A corporate raider can then offer a premium 
for the devalued stock, seize control, oust the incumbent managers, and 
profit by reviving the firmY Ironically, the sharpest critics of this ex-
alted view of hostile takeovers are corporate executives, the neoclas-
sicists' fellow critics of the managerial discretion theory. 32 Executives 
decry hostile takeovers as a disaster for all the target's constituencies, 
including its shareholders. Although this view is flawed, 33 it is true that 
takeovers do not curb managerial discretion. 
First, tender offers do not strike all mismanaged companies, and 
only mismanaged companies. Share prices do tend toward fundamental 
values over time; however, substantial variations may persist for long 
periods. 34 A well-managed company may be undervalued and attract a 
27. See infra notes 54, 108. 
28. See infra notes 50-52. 
29. For example, the radical leveraging of many companies in recent years increased 
their stock prices but devastated the value of their debt. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 51. 
30. Companies that raise outside capital prefer debt because it is cheaper (share purchas-
ers demand higher returns than lenders) and does not increase the firm's exposure to takeovers. 
Thus, one study of 12large industrial companies found that of the capital funds they invested over 
a decade, 74% came from retained earnings, 26% from long-term debt and none from new stock 
issues. G. DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
FINANCIAL GOALS SYSTEM 45-46 ( 1984). See also W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY 69-70, 79 (1965). 
31. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 20; Manne, supra note 20; Manne & Ribstein, The SEC 
v. the American Shareholder, NAT'L REv., Nov. 25, 1988, at 26, 27. 
32. Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance for Se((-Restraint, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985, 
at 30; Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FoRTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 133. 
33. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 20. Takeovers benefit shareholders by generating large 
premiums. The possibility of takeovers also helps to keep up stock prices. 
34. A firm's "fundamental value" represents the present value of all anticipated future 
earnings. See L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT's WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE 
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 53-54, 130-31 (1988); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Impli-
cations of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 902-08, 
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raider, while a poorly managed company may not. If a low stock price 
reflects poor management, the damage done may be so irreparable that 
no raider will try to salvage the firm. Thus, raiders do not invariably or 
even generally pursue poorly run companies. 35 Acquirers frequently 
overbid a firm's fundamental value, 36 so that even efficient manage-
ment and high stock prices do not insure against takeovers. Moreover, 
the randomness of tender offers blunts their effectiveness in deterring 
managerial slack. Managers may even become demoralized rather than 
motivated by the threat of a takeover. 3 7 
Similarly, a successful takeover does not guarantee optimal man-
agement. Acquiring firms are not noticeably more profitable than 
targets and do not generally increase the profits of acquired firms. 38 
Although the evidence here is necessarily soft, the conclusions do cast 
doubt on the neoclassicists' view of takeovers as a panacea. Manage-
ment techniques are not standardized. Rather, managers tend to be firm 
or industry specific; what worked for a raider in one business will not 
necessarily work with the target. 39 The bidder's management may not 
be especially competent at all. Significantly, in a bidding contest, the 
victor may be not the bidder who can best manage the target, but the 
bidder most willing to injure itself by bidding more than the value of the 
target. 
Third, managers of targets can avoid much of the sting of take-
overs by obtaining golden parachutes that grant them rich payments in 
case of an unsolicited takeover. Golden parachutes may be fair and 
even desirable for shareholders, 40 but they also diminish the disciplin-
ary power of takeovers. 
Fourth, tender offers are expensive and risky, and target managers 
can force up the costs and risks in several ways. Poison pills and other 
920-25 (1988); cf Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 341 (1988) (questioning the accuracy of stock market prices). 
35. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 134-35; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1145, 1211-12 (1984) (citing surveys of bidders). 
36. Dent; Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 777, 778-79 {1986). 
37. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1238-43. 
38. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 131-38 (studies show that targets have return on 
equity and return on capital at least as high as those of bidders). 
39. Hedlund, The Role of the Institutional Investor in the Governance of the Corpora-
tion: An International Overview 3-4 (May 23, 1988) (unpublished manuscript presented at a con-
ference at Columbia University entitled "The American Corporation and the Institutional Inves-
tor: Are There Lessons from Abroad?") [hereinafter Columbia Conference] (on file with the 
Wisconsin Law Review). 
40. Golden parachutes may prevent a raider from breaching the managers' implied con-
tract for back-loaded compensation. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 75-81. They also induce manag-
ers to invest their human capital in a firm, rather than go elsewhere, and dissuade them from 
opposing attractive tender offers. Both benefit shareholders. 
1989:881 Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation 889 
shark repellents can radically raise the costs of tender offers, thereby 
shrinking the disciplinary threat. Some defenses not only discourage a 
raider, but harm the target. A company that fears its cash reserves may 
attract raiders, for example, can drain the cash in unwise acquisitions.41 
Then, the disciplinary stick not only misses the miscreants, the target 
managers, but the diverted blow strikes the intended beneficiaries: the 
target's shareholders. State legislatures have welcomed these defenses, 
and have created new ones by statute. 42 But this does not mean that 
tender offers are on balance detrimental or useless as a disciplinary tool. 
They do oust some incompetent managements and, more important, 
spur others to pay attention to shareholders. The many corporate 
restructurings undertaken in recent years show the influence of take-
overs.43 But tender offers are not panacea. The huge premiums over 
market price in takeovers, which routinely exceed 50 percent, imply two 
important facts: first, such large premiums are hard to explain unless 
they reflect, in part, some slack in target management; second, a firm 
can endure significant slack before becoming a takeover target.44 
The weakness of economic constraints on management discretion 
would prompt no concern if the interests of managers and shareholders 
coincided. However, their interests often diverge. Managers fear risk 
more than shareholders do because managers cannot diversify their in-
vestment of human capital as shareholders can diversify their invest-
ments of money. Stuck with their eggs in one basket, managers treat 
that basket cautiously.45 Managers, therefore, pursue growth rather 
than maximum share value. Growth appeals to managers because it 
justifies larger compensation and executive perquisites, confers pres-
41. Black, Bidder Overpayments in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 612 et passim (1989) 
(discussing theory "that firms with 'free cash flow' (cash flow in excess of that required to fund the 
firm's positive net present value projects) tend to waste that cash flow on excessive growth-in-
cluding growth through acquisitions-rather than return it to shareholders"); Panter v. Marshall 
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981) (takeover target exhausted spare cash with 
acquisitions). 
42. See il?fra note 160. 
43. Fear of takeovers has forced many managements to forgo unprofitable growth and 
low debt by selling assets, making payouts to shareholders, and refinancing with debt. See Coffee, 
supra note 12, at 41-52. 
44. Kraakman, supra note 34 (discussing discounts and discretion). See generally W. 
McEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE (1975) (performance of management-
controlled companies tends to lag somewhat behind that of management-owned and investor-
controlled companies). 
45. W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 7-20; Coffee, supra note 12, at 15-23, 68; Marcus, 
Risk-Sharing and the Theory of the Firm, 13 BELL J. EcoN. 369,373-75 (1982); Oesterle & Norberg, 
Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207,230-
31 (1988). 
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tige, promises more promotions, diminishes risk, and protects the firm 
from raiders by increasing the cost of a takeover. 46 
The fear of risk and preference for growth show up in corporate 
planning, financing and dividend policies. Shareholders prefer high lev-
erage because it increases share values. 4 7 Managers dislike debt because 
it increases the risk of bankruptcy and wide swings in corporate earn-
ings, which in turrt affect performance-based compensation. Some 
managers also act to increase current earnings, despite injury to the 
firm, because their compensation is often tied to earning.48 Investors, 
especially institutions, willingly assume the greater risks of leverage be-
cause the statistically predictable failure of a few investments in their 
diversified portfolios is outweighed by the equally predictable success of 
many others. 
Shareholders also want dividends.49 Managers prefer to retain 
earnings to permit growth without outside financing. 50 This preference 
is so pronounced that some studies find that returns on retained earn-
ings approach zero. 51 In general, managers have prevailed; dividends 
of American corporations have been very low. Managers seeking 
46. W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS383-85 (4th ed. 1977); G. 
DONALDSON, supra note 30, at 37; 0. WILLIAMsON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 1. FIN. EcoN. 305 (!976). 
47. Interest on debt is deductible for federal income tax purposes and returns on debt are 
lower. Therefore, refinancing with debt often increases earnings per share. Higher debt also in-
creases the risk of loss, but the shareholders foist some of this risk onto employees, trade creditors 
and prior lenders. 
48. For example, many public companies still use first-in, first-out accounting, even 
though jt does not increase real earnings but only results in higher taxes than last-in, first-out 
accounting. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Tender Offers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 288-89 (1983). Management-controlled companies often magnify 
reported earnings despite resulting higher taxes. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 
Misc. 2d 809,383 N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd on opin. below, 54 A.D.2d 654,387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (!976) (suit 
alleging that board gave up tax benefits by spinning off rather than selling depreciated assets in 
order to maximize officers' earnings-based compensation). 
49. This preference seems to be tied to managerial discretion. Dividends may be one way 
of forcing managers to submit plans for growth to the monitoring of outside investors who would 
finance growth only if it promised to be profitable. See Booth, Junk Bonds, the Relevance of Divi-
dends and the Limits of Managerial Discretion, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 553; Easterbrook, Two 
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 650, 654 (1984). 
50. G. DONALDSON, supra note 30, at 45-46; Coffee, supra note 12, at 20-22. See also 
supra note 30. Executives even opposed ending the double taxation of dividends because it would 
increase shareholder pressure for dividends. See Why Washington May Not Lay a Glove on LBOs, 
Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 86. 
51. Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt, Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 
REv. EcoN. & STATS. 128 (1973); Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt, Earnings Retenlion, New 
Capital and the Growth oft he Firm, 52 REV. EcoN. & STATS. 345 ( 1970) (during 1948-59, returns on 
retained earnings for U.S. companies averaged between 3% and 4.6%; for firms that issued little 
new equity, returns approached zero). See also M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 
IN A DYNAMIC EcoNOMY 233-37 (1987) (reviewing the literature and discussing studies showing 
frequent damage to acquiring firms). 
1989:881 Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation 891 
growth sometimes knowingly pursue unprofitable transactions. Corpo-
rate acquisitions are often disadvantageous and even devastating for 
the acquiring company; yet such deals are far too frequent to be written 
off as errors of judgment. 52 
Managerial and shareholder interests also diverge over executive 
compensation. Managers want high pay for little work; shareholders 
favor the opposite. Executive compensation in owner-controlled firms 
equals or exceeds that in management-controlled firms. 5 3 Public firms, 
however, provide more sumptuous executive perquisites, such as luxu-
rious facilities and offices, staff, and corporate jets. 54 Counting perqui-
sites, executive compensation in public companies is much higher. 
The interests of executives and shareholders diverge most dramati-
cally in takeovers and management buyouts. Despite accusations of 
many executives that tender offers are no boon to target shareholders, 55 
even sophisticated shareholders approve of tender offers. Investors may 
also want reforms that encourage competitive bidding and ease the 
shareholders' collective action problems in order to obtain the maxi-
mum possible premium. 56 Managers, however, often construct de-
fenses to thwart all bids, rather than to extract the highest premium. 
These measures so damage investor interests that even normally passive 
52. Black, supra note 41, at 616-23; Dent, supra note 36, at 780-81 (discussing studies 
showing frequent damage to acquiring firms). 
53. W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 7-20, 65-66, 80, 86-87 (reviewing prior literature). 
In management-owned companies, the managers control through stock ownership. In manage-
ment-controlled companies, managers lack sufficient stock to exercise direct control, but maintain 
control through the proxy mechanism. See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text. In investor-
controlled companies, one or a few large shareholders control the board but do not manage the 
company; officers are hired to manage but do not control. W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 60. 
54. W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 65-66, 80, 86-87. Kohl berg, Kravis & Roberts, the 
acquirer in the RJR Nabisco buyout, estimated it could save $100 million per year just by retiring 
RJR's fleet of planes. Helyar & Burrough, How Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without High-
est Bid, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at AI, col. 6. Choice of location for corporate headquarters can 
also be expensive. Of 38 firms that left New York City in recent years, 31 moved to within eight 
miles of the CEO's home, even though those firms lagged in economic performance behind those 
that remained. See W. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER 287-97 (1989). This suggests that 
these CEO's put their personal convenience over firm profitability. 
It is unclear why managers of public companies prefer indirect compensation. Perhaps 
threats of lawsuits and adverse publicity among shareholders, employees and public officials en-
courage managers to opt for indirect compensation because it is harder to detect and measure. See 
W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 13-14. 
55. See supra note 32. 
56. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural 
Limitations on the Enabling Concepts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1982); Lowenstein, supra note 48, at 
317-34. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target"s Management in Responding 
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (competitive bidding injures investors by discour-
aging initiation of takeover bids). 
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shareholders oppose them. 57 The managers' success in adopting anti-
takeover measures is the strongest evidence of managerial discretion. 
Many managers responded to takeovers by offering to buy out 
public shareholders with borrowed money and take their companies 
private. Leveraged management buyouts do generate premiums, but do 
not always maximize shareholder returns. 58 Managers cannot be im-
partial in buyouts because they have such heavy interests at stake. 
Outside directors are poorly positioned to bargain with rr:anagement; 
their access to information and knowledge of the firm and its industry 
are inferior to those of management. Further, they naturally defer to 
management. Thus, managers have significant discretion in timing and 
structuring these deals. 59 
In sum, the Berle-Dodd thesis is valid and significant: managers of 
public companies are not tightly controlled by shareholders, outside 
directors or economic forces, but enjoy considerable discretion. This 
discretion varies among public companies and commentators disagree 
about its breadth. However, most agree that it is significant. 
The motto, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," reflects a fatal smugness 
in American businesses. When a firm is broke, it may be beyond repair. 
Although most public corporations are not "broke," there is plenty of 
room for improvement. Corporate governance plays as great a role in 
the economy as product development, marketing and finance. Exces-
sive managerial discretion not only cheats investors, it is inefficient and 
undermines our economy. Means to reduce it should be sought. 
C. Support for Separation of Ownership and Control:Managerialism 
Some commentators welcomed the news that corporate managers 
had freed themselves from shareholder domination. 60 In this 
"managerialist" view, large corporations are not private enterprises, 
but social institutions accountable not only to shareholders but to 
many constituencies, including creditors, consumers, employees, sup-
pliers and the communities in which the firms operate. Shareholders, 
obsessed with profits, would slight other constituencies. Managers, 
however, take a broader perspective that balances the needs of the 
firms' many publics. Reflecting this view, many state legislatures have 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42. 
58. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 183-86. 
59. Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 45, at 218-20, 235. 
60. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
See also Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management v. Stockholders, 41 HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 
1963, at 116; Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 (1958). Some commentators em-
brace managerialism only indirectly; they do not expressly praise it, but they criticize forces that 
limit managerial discretion. See Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 29, 1989 (Magazine), at 32. 
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adopted statutes permitting directors to consider other constituencies 
when weighing a takeover bid. 61 
Most commentators have not been so sanguine about managerial 
discretion. In a classic debate with Dodd, Berle himself argued against 
vesting broad power in self-selected business managers with no more 
than a "pious wish" that something good come of it. 62 
Experience confirms that managers do not exercise discretion for 
the good of society. While managers probably contribute more to chari-
ties than shareholders would, they do not otherwise display notable be-
neficence. For example, management buyouts produce no more 
favorable treatment for employees or communities than takeovers by 
corporate raiders, who are so often maligned for their cold-hearted-
ness. 63 For the most part, managers have used discretion to benefit 
themselves. 64 
Even if managers showed greater social sensitivity than investors, 
manageria1ism would still be objectionable. In a democracy, decisions 
about spending other people's money are made by elected officials. 
Vesting broad discretion over social policies in a self-selected corporate 
oligarchy violates this principle. Taxpayers as well as shareholders pay 
for this discretion because reduced profits from discretion generate 
lower tax revenues; taxpayers, however, have no say in how the discre-
tion is exercised. Corporate managers tend to fund noncontroversial 
activities, such as public television and museum shows. Shareholders 
61. Johnson & Million, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 846, 848-50 (1989). 
62. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 
1368 (1932). Berle's later "concession" has been misconstrued. He conceded that "[t]he argument 
has been settled ... squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention." A. BERLE, THE 20TH CEN-
TURY CAFJTALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). He was only recognizing that the law permitted manag-
ers to consider social concerns as well as profit. He never conceded, however, that Dodd was right 
as a matter of policy. See olso M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 19 ("it is only the shareholders' role 
that prevents ... a de jure self-perpetuating oligarchy"); id. at 120-21 (there is no reason to believe 
that managers will use discretion "selflessly and wisely"). · 
In The Modem Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means were ambiguous about 
managerialism. They argued that 
[w]hen a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally 
accepted, in that moment the passive property right [i.e., the rights of shareholders] must 
yield before the larger interests of society. Should the corporate leaders, for example, set 
forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their 
public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits 
from the owners of passive property, and should the community generally accept such a 
scheme ... , the interests of passive property owners would have to give way. 
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note I, at 356. Although this passage contemplates managers divert-
ing profits to social objectives, it also contemplates public approval to enact such a program. 
Accordingly, it seems consistent with Berle's criticisms of true managerialism, and therefore is 
more of an alternative vision for corporate reform. 
63. Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 45, at 237-39. 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51. Because of these problems, advocates of 
social responsibility have often pursued other reforms. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73. 
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and taxpayers might prefer different priorities, and entertain alternative 
notions of social responsibility. Managerial discretion would also sabo-
tage the market mechanism, thereby injuring not only investors but also 
the intended beneficiaries, such as consumers and employees. 65 
Some commentators support managerial control because share-
holders' view of corporate policies is too short term. Unlike other 
managerialist views, this position praises managerial control as benefi-
cial for shareholders rather than, or as well as, for other interest groups. 
This argument will be discussed below because it bears on the proposal 
advanced in this Article. 66 
D. Deploring Separation: Corporate Reformers 
Most commentators accept the Berle-Means thesis, but many, in-
cluding Berle and Means, 67 have mixed or unclear goals. In the last 
category are proposals, made for over a century, for federal incorpora-
tion of public companies. These proposals spring from dissatisfaction 
with state regulation. 68 Federal incorporation is not an end in itself; 
rather, it is a means to the other goals of managerial responsiveness to 
shareholder and social needs. 
Social responsibility proposals have foundered for three reasons. 
First, proponents often disagree about what, if anything, social respon-
sibility means beyond a duty of the firm to obey the law. Proposals have 
urged greater responsibility to the environment, racial minorities, 
women, employees, consumers, suppliers and communities in which the 
firm operates inter alia. However, proponents have not agreed on how 
to serve these disparate and often conflicting interests. 69 Employees 
and consumers, for example, would clash over prices for the firm's 
products. In addition, proponents have not fashioned mechanisms to 
achieve their goals. For example, in the 1970s, Ralph Nader and others 
65. See infra notes 71-73. 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 211-30. 
67. Much of their volume is devote<1 to decrying the erosion of fiduciary standards. A. 
BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note l, at 220-76. They close, however, with an argument that social 
concerns may override shareholder interests. !d. a! 356. See supra note 62. 
68. The most recent wave of federal incorporation proposals took place in the 1970s and 
began with an article by former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman William Cary: 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 ( 1974). He 
argued that the states, led by Delaware, were engaged in a "race for the bottom" to attract 
franchise fees. !d. at 666. In this race, the states competed to enlarge managerial power at the 
expense of shareholders. He proposed not federal incorporation, but federal minimum standards 
for state incorporation./d. at 665-66. His proposal spawned others. See, e.g., Nader, The Case for 
Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67,84-90 (1973); Schwartz, The Case for 
Federal Chartering, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 ( 1976). 
69. R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 688-90 (social responsibility proposals are vague about 
goals and inconsistent about means). 
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proposed that various constituencies be represented on the boards of 
public companies. 70 However, they never explained how consumers, 
for example, could choose representatives for these seats. 
Most important, saddling the corporation with heavy and proba-
bly ill-defined social responsibilities would undermine the market 
mechanism to the detriment of investors and society generally, includ-
ing the intended beneficiary constituencies. 71 Staffing corporate boards 
with representatives of competing constituencies would provoke con-
flict inimical to corporate planning. Diminishing the profit orientation 
of public companies would hobble them relative to private companies. 
Moreover, only shareholders have what Dean Manning calls the "per-
spective of the aggregate," that is, the devotion to efficiency that comes 
from being paid last, after all other constituencies have been satisfied. 72 
Investors would not accept lower returns on equity than on other in-
vestments. Therefore, new equity could be obtained only at returns at 
least as high as those previously offered. This raises the cost of equity 
capital for public corporations, which in turn means higher prices for 
the firm's products, lower compensation for its employees, and disin-
vestment from public corporations. The value of existing shares can be 
plundered for the benefit of other constituencies. This raises questions 
of the fairness of fundamentally changing rules in the middle of the 
game. Further, investors could recoup their losses by selling out in a 
takeover. 73 The interests of other constituencies are best served not by 
tinkering with corporate governance, but through labor and consumer 
protection laws that optimize the constituencies' dealings with corpora-
tions, or through taxes on profits for social purposes. 
Many reform efforts have aimed to benefit shareholders through 
shareholder democracy. Berle and Means helped to spark adoption of 
the full disclosure policy of the federal securities laws. 74 Although this 
70. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 123-26 
( 1976). For these reasons, some social responsibility proponents have embraced managerialism. 
See supra text accompanying notes 60-65. 
71. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility,'32 STAN. L. REV. I (1979); 
Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 20-23 
(1977); Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46,64 (E. Mason 7th ed. 1970); Rum!, Corporate Management 
as a Locus of Power, 29 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 228,242-43 (1951). See also M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM 
AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
72. Manning, supra note 71, at 21. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 403. 
Social reform schemes could make debt more attractive because creditors bargain for fixed returns 
and thus are less affected by discretionary reduction of profits. This exacerbates tensions between 
shareholders, who can profit by refinancing the firm with debt, and managers, who resist debt. See 
supra notes 47, 58-59. See also Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 45, at 208-09. 
73. If social responsibility rules applied only to public corporations, these rules could be 
avoided by selling the equity to a purchaser who would take the company private. 
74. Hessen, supra note 19, at 279. 
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policy was designed primarily to facilitate investment decisions, it was 
also meant to assist shareholders in controlling their companies. To this 
end, Congress authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to require full disclosure in, and otherwise to regulate, proxy 
solicitations. 75 Proxy disclosure has not led to shareholder control; 
management still runs the proxy machinery and shareholders still lack 
any plausible alternative to supporting management. 76 Further, some 
SEC shareholder democracy initiatives have been counterproductive. 
For example, Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, has become 
the tool of a vocal, politicized minority rather than a vehicle for share-
holder control. 77 Reform proposals have failed to advance shareholder 
control because they envision a town-meeting form of democracy. The 
shareholders of public companies are too numerous and scattered, and 
their interests are too small for them to attain this vision. 78 
Reformers have advocated, inter alia, mandatory cumulative vot-
ing, 79 mandatory stock ownership by directors and stricter devotion to 
fiduciary principles. 80 Even if these suggestions make sense, they fall far 
short of curbing management control. Current reform efforts focus on 
the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project. The 
Project's reporters champion the monitoring model of corporate gov-
ernance pioneered by Melvin Eisenberg, the Project's chief reporter. 
The monitoring model concedes that outside directors cannot manage 
the corporation, as traditional statutes in theory required them to do. 
Outside directors can perform a valuable service, however, by oversee-
ing or monitoring management. 81 In particular, the monitoring model 
advocates several board oversight committees to be staffed primarily by 
outside directors and to oversee the firm audit, executive compensation 
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, !5 U.S.C. § 78m (!988). The SEC has pro-
moted disclosure to overcome shareholder apathy. SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING, HousiNG AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 66-68 
(Comm. Print !980) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. 
76. See infra notes !21-38. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 4!9-20 
("shareholders' involvement in the voting process has not increased with the adoption of the proxy 
rules"). 
77. Dent, SEC Rule !4a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. l 
(!985). The rule permits shareholders who satisfy certain conditions to have their proposals in-
cluded in the corporation's proxy statement at no cost to the shareholder. 
78. Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 776, 807 (1979). 
79. Cumulative voting "can have a positive effect on firm value." Bhagat & Brickley, 
Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J. L. & EcoN. 339, 342 
(!984). See also Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Comests, II 1. FIN. 
ECON. 40! (!983). 
80. Berle and Means stressed fiduciary duties. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note !, at 
220-76. 
8!. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at !62-70. See also Dent, The Revolution in Corporate 
Gol'ernance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623, 629-34 
(198!). 
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and director nominations. 82 Monitoring by outside directors under this 
model extends beyond the oversight committees; however, the further 
duties are never clearly spelled out. 
Ironically, the ALI Project has, in part, succumbed to the success 
of the monitoring model. In the last fifteen years, outside directors have 
become a majority of most public firm boards. 83 Additionally, most 
large public companies have also established all or most of the three 
oversight committees envisioned by the model. Some critics of the 
Project argue that most of the model's objectives have been achieved 
and that further steps are unnecessary and possibly counterproduc-
tive. 84 The critics, including the Business Roundtable, charge that the 
Project would mandate monitoring by threatening directors with liabil-
ity if a court concludes that they were careless and caused a corporate 
loss. This threat, they claim, would discourage innovation and risk tak-
ing. They also argue that vigorous monitoring would make the board 
and management adversaries, thereby hindering the board's effective-
ness. The neoclassicists argue that the ALI's reforms are unnecessary 
because the market already perfects corporate governance. 85 Interest-
ingly, the critics have not included institutional or other investors. 
Defenders reply that the Project would impose liability only for 
gross imprudence, not for reasonable or even adventurous risks, and 
would in many respects diminish the directors' risk of liability. 86 They 
also deny that the Project would spawn conflict between management 
and the board. To mollify critics, the drafters diluted many fiduciary 
obligations and enforcement provisions of the Project's early drafts. 8 7 
Professor Eisenberg admits that the monitoring model's goals are mod-
82. The audit committee works with the firm's accountants to ensure that management 
cooperates with the audit and accurately reports the company's financial condition. The compen-
sation committee structures executive compensation to encourage good performance. To help en-
sure the board's independence, the nominating committee selects nominees for what is generally 
automatic election to the board of directors by shareholders. ABA Committee on Corporate 
Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979). 
83. Commentators disagree about the breadth of this development, largely because of 
disagreement about the definition of outside directors. Many who ostensibly are outside directors 
have ties to the corporation that may compromise their independence. See infra note 93. Also, the 
number of outside directors may recently have declined slightly. 
84. See generally BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 16; THE ALI AND CoR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (1987) (a collection of essays criticizing tenta-
tive drafts of the ALI Project). 
85. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
86. For example, the Project recommends a cap on the liability of directors for breach of 
the duty of care. See ALI PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.17, at 25-26 (Tent. Draft No.7, Apr. I 0. 1987). 
See generally Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla 
and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789, 801-03 (1984); Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in 
the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 582,596-98 (1984). 
87. Brudney, Corporate Governance. Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 
COLUM. L. REV.I403, 1410n.l9(1985). 
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est and that it will make an important difference only "in the lOOth or 
200th or 300th case."88 
The Project's defenders may be right that it would do little to 
change corporate governance. Nevertheless, their denial underscores 
the Project's most serious shortcoming: it does not resolve the ultimate 
problem of separation of ownership and control. Notwithstanding the 
widespread adoption of some elements of the monitoring model, man-
agers still dominate directors. In a leading study, 89 Myles Mace showed 
that boards do not manage; rather, they render advice when asked for it 
and in dire emergencies replace the chief executive officer (CEO). The 
impotence of outside directors springs first from their composition and 
selection. Despite the proliferation of nominating committees, CEOs 
still influence the selection of directors. The CEO can veto a candidate 
she opposes, and over time she usually obtains the board she wants. 90 
The CEO naturally picks people who share her background and general 
views and whom she expects will not rock the boat. 91 Outside directors 
know this, and therefore choose not to rock the boat; if they are unable 
to go along with management, they either resign or decline the position 
to begin with. If they rock the boat, they are removed. 92 Many direc-
tors are officers subordinate to the CEO. Many outside directors are 
only nominally independent; they include lawyers, bankers, suppliers, 
accountants and investment bankers who do business with the corpora-
tion and thus depend on the CEO's goodwill. 93 
Outsiders are also hampered by the limited time they devote to the 
firm, their limited knowledge about its workings and their lack of inde-
pendent sources of information. Directors typically meet about once a 
month, which is far too little time for the outsider to master the firm's 
88. Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 597. 
89. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (I97I). See also R. GORDON, BUSINESS 
LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION I I4, 128-31 (2d ed. I96I); Brudney, The Independent 
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597 (I982). 
90. Patton & Baker, Why Won't Directors Rock the Boat?, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 
I987, at 10, I I; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Semry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate 
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, I233 (I977). Independent nomi-
nating committees have not made much difference. SeeR. CLARK, supra note 5, at I08-09; Brud-
ney, supra note 89, at 62 I -22; Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect Shareholders, FORTUNE, Sept. 
I 7, I 984, at 28, 28-29; Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 
293, 298 (I 979). 
9(. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTRCL, CORPORATE POWER 29 (I98J). 
92. CEOs often "fire" outside directors. See M. MACE, supra note 89, at 80. See also 
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD I 2 (I 977) (over 36% of industrial companies 
surveyed reported having "fired" directors). However, removal of CEOs by outside boards also 
seems to have increased. See Brudney, supra note 89, at 633 n.93; Coffee, supra note 35, at I 202-03. 
93. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 144-46; E. HERMAN, supra note 9 I, at 26-48; Brudney, 
supra note 89, at 602-03; SEC REPORT, supra note 75, at 432-33 (half of outside directors have ties 
that compromise independence). 
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affairs. 94 They receive most of their information from the managers, 
the very people directors are supposed to oversee. 95 Not surprisingly, 
then, management sets the board's agenda; "the board itself has little 
capacity to generate significant proposals. " 96 The board routinely de-
fers to the CEO on business questions. 97 
Finally, outside directors lack incentives to assert independence 
and maximize profits. Most outsiders are well-paid executives of other 
companies. Their compensation as outside directors is a small fraction 
of their income and usually less pay per hour than their full-time jobs.98 
Most own little stock in the companies they direct; their compensation 
is not tied to the corporation's or their own performance. 99 Thus, even 
if they could improve the firm's performance, outside directors would 
not benefit from their effort. 100 If the corporation commits a costly mis-
take, however, they may be held liable or at least subjected to an un-
pleasant lawsuit. "If anything, they have reason to be even more risk 
averse than managers." 101 Together, these factors foster a 
"groupthink" atmosphere to which directors conform. 102 Thus, 
94. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 141-43; Dent, supra note 81, at 627-28. One study 
reports that the average outside director devotes only 122 hours per year to his position. Brudney, 
supra note 89, at 609 n.38 (citing KORN/fERRY INT'L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS: EIGHTH ANNUAL 
STUDY 20 (1981)). The problem is exacerbated by the growing size and complexity of large corpo-
rations, E. HERMAN, supra note 91, at 32, ancl by the trend for outside directors to hold several 
directorships, Patton & Baker, supra note 90, at II. 
95. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 143-44; Mace, supra note 90, at 303. Some outside 
directors, such as suppliers, customers and bankers, may have both the incentive and the means to 
obtain independent information. See Macey Letter, supra note 19. The interests of these directors 
in the firm, however, are likely to diverge from the typical shareholder's interest in maximizing 
share value. 
96. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Direcwr's Duty of Attention: Time for 
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1484 ( 1984), But see Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board, 80 
MICH. L. REV. I (1981). 
97. Manning, supra note 96, at 1490-91. 
98. Brudney, supra note 89, at 613. 
99. Patton & Baker, supra note 90, at I 0-11. The usual justification for denying outside 
directors incentive compensation is that they have a minimal effect on corporate performance. See 
M. MACE, supra note 89, at 102-03. 
100. Brudney, supra note 89, at 634. Some commentators speculated that a market for 
outside directors would develop; directors would cultivate reputations as expert monitors. See 
Fama & Jensen, supra note 18, at 315. No such market has evolved. So long as managers dominate 
the selection and functioning of directors, they will choose and keep directors who do not rock the 
boat, rather than directors who are aggressive, independent monitors. It has been suggested that 
directors are motivated by the fear that performing poorly would damage their reputations. Ma-
cey Letter, supra note 19. If everyone expects outside directors to be passive, however, a director 
does not hurt his reputation by being passive. 
101. Coffee, supra note 12, at 26. 
102. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1233; Brudney, supra note 89, at634 n.98; Haft, supra note 
96, at 35-39. The outsiders' passivity reflects no moral defect; groupthink pressures everyone to 
conform. Werner, Corporate Law in Search of Its Future, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1663 (1981) 
(citing M. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS (1976); J. TEDESCHI & S. LINDSKOLD, SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGY 
561-73 (1976); Reed, On the Dynamics of Group Decisionmaking in High Places, DIRS. & Bos., 
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outside directors might not be more independent and effective even if 
the methods of their selection were improved. All incentives push them 
to caution and minimal involvement, a far cry from the preferences of 
the investors who in theory look to directors to work hard and accept 
risks in pursuit of maximum profits. 
Outside boards do not financially outperform 103 and are not more 
socially responsible104 than inside boards. Indeed, while the law treats 
the board as central to corporate governance, business analysts ignore 
the board, dismissing it as "a vestigial appendix." 105 The impotence of 
outside directors shows in their failure to limit managerial discretion. 
Outside boards do remove CEOs for poor performance more often 
than insider-dominated boards. 106 Nevertheless, they have neither 
curbed the managers' preference for growth over profits nor discovered 
and stopped illegal activities. 107 They have had little effect on executive 
compensation. 108 Outsiders have also failed to control management 
buyouts; they often approve buyouts on management's terms and 
sometimes even impede competing bids by outsiders. 109 
Most dramatically, though, outside boards have not prevented, 
limited, or even criticized the adoption of anti-takeover measures, no 
matter what the cost to the firm or to shareholders. These measures 
cannot be categorically censured; some may foil unfair tactics by raid-
ers and get shareholders the highest price for their stock. Even the most 
Winter 1978, at 40. See also Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894, 1897-1901 (1983). 
!03. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at !33; Brudney, supra note 89, at 635 nn.lOl-03; 
MacAvoy, ALI Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board of Directors: An 
Economic Analysis, in BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 16, at C-28 to C-34. A few 
commentators find that outside boards have been financially superior. See Baysinger & Butler, 
supra note 19, at 572; Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Per-
formance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, l 1. L. & EcoN. ORG. !01, 118-19, 121 (1985) 
(boards with a mix of inside and outside directors are most effective); Fama, Agency Problems and 
the Theory of the Firm, 88 1. PoL. EcoN. 288, 293-94 (1980). However, firms with a dominant 
shareholder tend to have a low number ofoutside directors. See w. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 
57. This suggests that knowledgeable shareholders do not find outside directors very useful. 
!04. Brudney, supra note 89, at 646-58. 
105. Coffee, supra note 90, at 1142. 
!06. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 1. FIN. EcoN. 431, 432, 458 
(1988). The data are subject to conflicting interpretations, however. See id. at 453-55. 
!07. E. HERMAN, supra note 91, at 32-33 (almost all firms that have been involved in 
corporate scandals have had a large majority of outside directors); Brudney, supra note 89, at 616 
(finding no evidence that outside directors effectively curb management overreaching); Vance, Di-
rector Diversity: New Dimensions in the Boardroom, DIRS. & BDs., Spring, 1977, at 40, 41. Outsid-
ers have rarely dissented on matters in which insiders were later held liable or settled for substan-
tial sums. Brudney, supra note 89, at 617-18. Moreover, some doubt exists about whether outside 
audit committees can improve the accuracy of financial information. See id. at 637-39. 
108. E. HERMAN, supra note 91, at 354 n.50; Brudney, supra note 89, at 608 n.32; Kraus, 
Executive Pay: Ripe for Reform?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 36, 36-37. 
!09. Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 45, at 236-37. 
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vociferous critics of takeovers, however, concede that defensive tactics 
often maim target companies. 110 
To remedy the shortcomings of outside directors, the ALI Project 
advances a "command model" of corporate governance; it would stim-
ulate directors by exhortation and the threat of legal sanctions. In this 
respect, the ALI agrees with those who would tackle the separation of 
ownership and control with greater devotion to fiduciary principles. 111 
So long as the reasons for directors' passivity remain, however, exhor-
tations to greater effort will fall on deaf ears. The threat of liability has 
long been problematic in corporate law.lt is extremely difficult to deter-
mine whether a board's negligence caused a corporate loss and, if so, 
which directors were culpable. To impose liability for an entire loss 
would often be draconian. Recognizing these problems, corporate law 
has hesitated to hold directors liable except for self-dealing. As Profes-
sor Bishop has said, "The search for cases in which directors of indus-
trial corporations have been held liable ... for negligence uncompli-
cated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a 
very large haystack." 112 In the rare cases where directors are held lia-
ble, indemnification and insurance invariably save them from personal 
loss. 113 The ALI would improve the system ofliability by capping dam-
ages, thereby avoiding draconian liability. The ALI would also bar in-
demnification and insurance, thereby ensuring that directors pay some-
thing for their imprudence. 114 
The ALI proposals would improve corporate governance, but only 
marginally. Fiduciary duties work well where they require the fiduciary 
to perform ministerial tasks or to refrain from well-defined activities; 
they work less well where the fiduciary must exercise discretion. Judges 
II 0. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 162-64; Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of 
Finance Capitalism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. I, 28-35,64-65 (1987). On the shareholder wealth effects of 
defensive tactics; see Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, TheM arket for Corporate Control: The Empirical 
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 49 (1988); Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (A. Auerbach ed. 1987); SEC OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE 
EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS (Oct. 23, 1986). 
Ill. Brudney, supra note 89, at 659. Although the reporters would prod directors with 
threats of liability, they retain corporate law's vagueness as to what directors are supposed to do. 
See infra note 185. 
112. Bishop, Silting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. I 078, I 099 (1968). 
113. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the most controversial duty of 
care case in history, the Delaware Supreme Court found the directors liable for gross negligence; 
the parties then settled damages at $235 million. This entire amount was paid, however, by the 
directors' insurance and by the acquiring company in the challenged transaction. See W. CARY & 
M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 541 (6th ed. 1988). Thus, the exceptional 
case proves the rule of no personal liability. However, even this minimal threat proved too much 
for the corporate bar. It persuaded most state legislatures to adopt statutes that limit director 
liability for lack of care. See infra note 117. 
114. See supra note 86. 
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cannot watch over the directors' shoulders and dictate their every 
move. Increasing liability for carelessness will not motivate the director 
who is minimally adequate. More likely, it would scare off directors and 
magnify their concern about liability insurance115 and aversion to risk, 
as the Project's critics charge. 116 The ALI Projec;;t has also been out-
flanked by the corporate bar. While the ALI reporters worked to 
toughen directors' duties, the bar persuaded many state courts and leg-
islatures to reduce or eliminate directors' duties and liabilities. 11 7 
To make matters worse, outside directors may actually expand 
manager discretion by immunizing them from liability. Courts rou-
tinely hold that approval of corporate action by outside directors cures 
any conflict of interest on the part of managers, and shifts the burden to 
the complaining shareholder to prove that the action was unreasonable 
or unfair. 118 Committees of outside directors that review derivative 
suits almost invariably recommend dismissal of the suits, and courts 
typically defer to these recommendations. 119 Outside directors also 
help defeat challenges to takeover defenses. 12° Courts believe that out-
sider review protects shareholders. The findings of Mace and others 
about the passivity of outside directors and their failure to curb or even 
object to anti-takeover activities and other damaging practices belies 
this reasoning. 
The problems of corporate governance will not be solved until 
ownership and control are united. The current debate over the ALI 
Project offers no solution because it has bogged down over trivia; even 
the Project's supporters do not expect it to improve corporate perform-
ance markedly. Students of corporate law should jettison this sterile 
debate and seek more fruitful approaches. If corporate boards serve 
115. It has become more difficult to attract outside directors in recent years. Melloan, A 
Good Director is Gelling Harder to Find, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 39, col. 3. The searchers still 
limit themselves, however, to the traditional pool of candidates. Director liability insurance has 
also become more difficult to obtain and more expensive. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Responses 
to the D & 0 Insurance Crisis, 19 REV. SEc. & COMMOD!TIES REG. 263 ( 1986). It is not clear whether 
the increasing risk of liability has caused these developments, but undoubtedly the perception of 
greater risk has helped cause them. 
116. Andrews, Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 213, 
219 (1983). 
117. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 295 (1988); Hazen, Corpo-
rate Directors" Accoumability: The Race to the Bollom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REv. 171 
(1987). 
118. Brudney, supra note 89, at 603 n.l5 (outside director approval of interested transac-
tions); Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 45, at 242-43 (outside director approval of management 
buyouts). 
119. R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 645-49; Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in 
Derivatil'e Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE LJ. 959, 963 
nn.lJ-14. 
120. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
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little purpose and if reform proposals, including the ALI Project, prom-
ise. scant improvement, perhaps the board of directors should be abol-
ished. Any beneficial functions it performs could be handled in other 
ways at lower cost and without insulating managers from fiduciary ob-
ligations. Before taking this drastic step, however, we should consider 
whether some steps could resolve the corporate governance puzzle by 
joining ownership and control. 
Ill. THE SOURCE OF SEPARATION: PROXY VOTING 
The keystone to separation of ownership and control is the proxy 
system. 121 Shareholders elect directors, but few shareholders person-
ally attend shareholder meetings; most vote by proxy. Corporate law 
permits the board of directors to use the corporate treasury to solicit 
proxies under the name of the corporation. 122 If management domi-
nates the board, as it usually does in the large public corporation, then 
management controls proxy voting. Shareholders routinely give man-
agement their proxies, largely because they have no alternative. Any 
shareholder dissatisfied with management can wage a proxy contest for 
control of the firm, but the insurgent must pay her own costs and cam-
paign under her own name rather than that of the corporation. Man-
agement also runs shareholder meetings and can re-solicit shareholders 
who back dissidents. 
An insurgent must also overcome the Wall Street Rule: sharehold-
ers' tendency to either vote with management or sell their shares. 123 
This is extraordinarily difficult. Shareholders, especially institutions, 
are often criticized for passivity; 124 but under current practices, voting 
for management without thinking makes perfect economic sense. In-
deed, the shareholder attitude is often called "rational apathy." 125 
Nearly every shareholder realizes that she cannot individually affect the 
outcome of a proxy vote. If her vote will not affect the outcome, her 
rational level of investment in voting, including deciding how to vote 
and trying to persuade other shareholders, is zero. Even if a share-
holder's vote might affect the result, her rational investment will be 
121. Berle and Means recognized this. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note I, at 81-82, 86-
88. 
122. Soliciting under the name of the corporation also gives incumbents an important 
psychological advantage. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 112. 
123. For example, shareholder resolutions (other than those opposing anti-takeover mea-
sures, see infra note 140) opposed by management typically get little support. Dent, supra note 77, 
at 4-5. When supported by management, however, the same measures are overwhelmingly 
approved. 
124. SEC REPORT, supra note 75, at 379-429; Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate 
Democracy: Control of Investment Managers" Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 670, 686 (1980). 
125. Clark, supra note 78, at 779-83; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at402. 
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small unless the holdings, the potential impact of the vote on the firm, 
and the odds of affecting the result are all very large. Thus, if an inves-
tor owns $50,000 worth of stock in a firm and a correct decision in a 
proxy vote will increase the value of the firm by one percent, the inves-
tor would not rationally spend over $500 on the matter even if she could 
certainly decide the outcome. If the odds of changing the outcome are 
less than 100%, her rational investment must be discounted accord-
ingly. Other shareholders would benefit from her action, but the inves-
tor cannot force them to share her costs; they can "free ride" on her 
efforts. 126 Rarely. is the investor warranted in making any effort at all. 
Shareholders also tend to vote for management because assertive 
shareholders encounter management hostility. Managers can deny re-
bellious shareholders valuable information. 127 Bank trust departments 
hesitate to oppose managements for fear of offending them as commer-
cial clients. 128 Although the managers of issuer-sponsored pension 
funds are supposed to be independent, they can be fired by the issuer's 
management and are, therefore, loathe to oppose its will. 129 Executives 
sometimes badger officers of other companies to pressure their fund 
managers to approve anti-takeover measures. 130 Even absent specific 
pressures, fund managers know that executives dislike active sharehold-
ers, and, therefore, the fund managers keep a low profile to protect 
themselves. 131 Recently, however, the Department of Labor has in-
sisted that pension fund managers vote proxies solely in the interests of 
the fund. 132 
More surprising than management hostility are the legal pitfalls 
that activist investors face. One who discusses voting with a share-
holder may be deemed to be soliciting a proxy; soliciting proxies from 
126. Clark, supra note 78, at 783-84. 
127. L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 61. See generally 1. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CoN-
FLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 41-57 (1987) (describing pressures on institu-
tional investors to vote with management). 
128. 1. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note [27, at 41, 54; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 
61. 
129. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. 1.L. REF. I 17, 
148-49 (1988). 
130. 1. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 127, at 50-55; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 
61, 208-09; Dobrzynski, Whose Company Is It Anyway?, Bus. WK., Apr. 25, 1988, at 60, 61. 
131. Interestingly, managers of public pension funds, who are less subject to such pres-
sures, oppose shark repellents more often than private fund managers. S. MARCIL & P. O'HARA, 
VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE [ 987 PROXY SEA-
SON 38 (1987). 
132. Dept. of Labor, Release No. 88-241 (May I I, I 988) (describing letter sent by the 
Department of Labor in February, 1988). In testimony before Congress, Professor Tamar Frankel 
proposed criminal penalties for managers who pressure shareholders in proxy voting. Pension 
Funds in the Capital Markets, Hearings before Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Pro-
tection, and Finance, of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 78, 84 
(I 985). 
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more than ten shareholders requires the filing of a detailed proxy state-
ment.133 Even an informal meeting of shareholders owning over five 
percent of an issuer's stock may require that all file as a group under 
section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934134 and disclose their plans to 
the issuer. If together they own over ten percent, the shareholders may 
be considered a single beneficial owner for purposes of section 16 of the 
Exchange Act, 135 requiring them to disclose publicly all their trading in 
the stock and subjecting them to liability for short-swing trading. 136 
They could also collectively be deemed a controlling person subject to 
registration requirements and liability under the federal securities laws 
and common law. 137 These laws have never been applied to institu-
tional investors who discuss the affairs of portfolio companies without 
actually soliciting proxies or participating in control. The statutes' 
vagueness and the lack of clear safe harbors, however, deter institutions 
from acting. For all these reasons, proxy insurgencies are rare; success 
is even rarer. 1 3 8 
133. SEC Rule 14a-2(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-(2)(b)(l) (1989). SEC Rule 14a-l(/), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(/) (1989), defines "solicitation" to include any communication "reasonably 
calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." This vague stan-
dard is broadly construed to include communications that make no reference to proxy voting. 
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750,768 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 
F.2d 579, 600 (5th Cir. 1974). 
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988). See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), 
cerl. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) (shareholders gathered to act in concert are a "group" for pur-
poses of section 13(d)); accord General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95 (I st Cir. 1977). 
The term "beneficial ownership" is liberally construed and requires no written agreement among 
parties acting together. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp. Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1988). 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988). The term "beneficial owner" is not defined in the statute and 
its application to shareholder groups has not been addressed by the courts. 
136. Section 16(b) requires the disgorgement of any profits realized by officers, directors 
and large shareholders by purchasing and selling the company's stock within six months. 
137. Under section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988), "is-
suer" is defined to include any person who controls the issuer. The statute restricts sales of securi-
ties by such persons without registration. Conard, supra note 129, at 159-60. Section 15 of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and section 20 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988), 
impose liability on controlling persons. "Control" has been constru~d to include not only actual 
control, but also the ability to control, even if not actually exercised. Walston & Co., 7 S.E.C. 937 
(1940); Sommer, Who's "In Control", 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 564 (1966). In addition, many courts have 
imposed liability for securities fraud on controlling persons under such common law doctrines as 
respondeat superior, even where liability did not attach under the controlling person provisions of 
the securities laws. See, e.g., Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Atlantic 
Fin. Management, lnc., 784 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1986); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kahn, 629 
F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 207 ( )985). 
138. The proxy fight is "the most expensive, the most uncertain" takeover technique. 
Manne, supra note 20, at 114. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. 
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 137 (between 1956 and 1960, only nine of 28 proxy control fights 
succeeded). 
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Despite these obstacles, major investors have recently rebelled 
against some management actions. 139 Many corporate boards have 
adopted "poison pills" that complicate or prevent any takeover with-
out board approval. Institutional investors have introduced proxy pro-
posals requiring or encouraging management to submit poison pills to 
shareholder vote. Institutional investors have also opposed manage-
ments over greenmail, confidential voting and shareholder access to 
proxy statements. Although few of these proposals have succeeded, 
they attract much more support than most other challenges to manage-
ment. 140 To coordinate their activities, several institutions formed the 
Council of Institutional Investors. 141 This new activism reflects the in-
adequacy of the Wall Street Rule resulting from the institutions' 
growth: institutions now loom so large in the market that they cannot 
collectively abandon a company without suffering great losses because 
a simultaneous selloff would cause a precipitous decline in value. 142 
Moreover, when most public companies behave alike, as in adopting 
poison pills, the funds have few investment alternatives. The new activ-
ism shows that the stakes are so large in some areas, especially take-
overs, as to prod even the generally passive funds into action. 
The current proxy system is not immutable. Indeed, it was never 
carefully thought out, but evolved largely by default. If no one could 
tap the corporate treasury to solicit proxies, a firm might not get a quo-
rum for a shareholder meeting. The firm might also fall prey to an ad-
venturer who could win a proxy vote and capture control with only a 
few votes. To avoid these horrors, the corporation had to pay someone 
to solicit proxies. Not surprisingly, the board itself claimed that role, 
and the courts went along. 143 The result is disturbing, though; if the 
shareholders are supposed to select directors, it is incongruous to vest 
proxy control in incumbents seeking re-election. 144 This is like letting 
legislators fund their re-election campaigns from the public treasury 
139. Conard, supra note 129, at 145-46; Dobrzynski, supra note 130, at 60, 60-61. 
140. Institutions' Proxy Power Grows, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1988, at Dl, col. 3 ("resolu-
tions sponsored by institutional stockholders on 'corporate governance' issues achieved record 
support in 1988"); Dobrzynski, Evening the Odds in Proxy Fights, Bus. WK., July 4, 1988, at 37. 
Some proposals have succeeded. Santa Fe Shareholders Reject 'Poison Pill' Plan, N.Y. Times, May 
25, 1988, at D2, col. 5 (shareholders voted to recommend that board rescind poison pill). 
141. Rosenberg, The Revolt of the Institutional Shareholders, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, 
May 1987, at 131, 137. The institutions, "mainly public funds, can afford to take activist stands ... 
because they have no loyalty to their own companies." /d. at 132. 
142. Institutions' Proxy Power Grows, supra note 140. 
143. Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting and Refrig. Co., 187 N.Y. 
395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907). See also Rascovor v. American Linseed Co., 135 F. 341 (2d Cir. 1905). 
144. "Strict fiduciary standards would categorically preclude insiders from spending cor-
porate funds to perpetuate their power, whether they are deemed fiduciaries for stockholders alone 
or for several constituencies." Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate 
Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 283 (1966). See also M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 102-03. 
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while requiring challengers to pay their own way. This system makes 
the board a self-perpetuating oligarchy and, once management controls 
the board, the tool for managerial control of the firm. In short, the 
system generates the separation of ownership and control. 
This analysis belies the Panglossian claim of the neoclassicists, that 
the current corporate governance system is the best of all possible 
worlds because it has prevailed in competition among all possible 
forms. 145 Managerial control rests on a proxy system dictated by gov-
ernment, not by the market. The recent trend of taking public compa-
nies private suggests that the market itself dislikes aspects of the public 
corporation. The separation of ownership and control stemming from 
the proxy system may be the culprit. 
IV. RETURNING PROXY CONTROL TO THE SHAREHOLDERS 
A. The Proposal 
The proxy system is the key to management control; giving share-
holders control of the proxy system, therefore, is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for uniting ownership and control. However, collec-
tive action problems prevent coordination among all the shareholders, 
so control must vest in some subset of shareholders. Hence the law 
should grant exclusive access to the corporate treasury for proxy solici-
tations to a committee of the ten or twenty largest shareholders of the 
firm. 146 The largest shareholders should comprise this committee be-
cause they are the most knowledgeable, have the greatest stake in the 
firm and therefore should be the most diligent in improving corporate 
performance. 14 7 As institutional share ownership has grown, large 
shareholders have also become more representative. 148 The largest in-
stitutions would probably sit on several shareholder committees, thus 
developing expertise in that capacity. 
145. See supra note 18; infra text accompanying notes 203-09. 
146. While specific procedures for implementing this proposal are beyond the scope of 
this Article, some general guidelines are in order. The range of I 0 to '20 seems large enough to be 
representative and to have sufficient input without being unwieldy. Further evidence may be 
needed here. The SEC could use its rule-making power under this proposal, see infra text preceding 
note 162, to promulgate rules identifying the largest shareholders. The SEC could deal with such 
questions as whether affiliatec;l shareholders should be treated as one, whether a very large share-
holder could gain extra seats by splitting its holdings among affiliates, and whether certain classes 
of shareholders should be excluded from the committee because of conflicts of interest. 
147. A 1978 study of 122 Fortune 500 companies showed that the 20 largest shareholders 
owned on average slightly less than 20% of the shares. Demsetz, supra note 19, at B-5. 
148. The proportion of equities held by institutions may already exceed 50%. See Con-
ard, supra note 129, at 131. 
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Rational apathy, the typical shareholder's attitude toward corpo-
rate governance, 149 will not undermine shareholder committees. First, 
the committees need not participate in directing the company; they will 
only nominate directors to do the job. The mere fact that the directors 
will know that they have been chosen by investors should make them 
more responsive to shareholder concerns. Second, the committee 
should have access to corporate resources to obtain and generate infor-
mation it needs; individual members need not spend much of their own 
money. Third, where individual expenses are incurred, they will be jus-
. tified by investors' large holdings in the company and by the utility of 
the expenses in performing the usual portfolio management func-
tions.150 There are signs that institutions are willing to perform these 
tasks. 151 
This idea is not totally unprecedented. Many commentators recog-
nize that proxy voting is a travesty and recommend reforms. Like the 
current proposal, these recommendations acknowledge that institu-
tional investors must act for all if shareholder involvement is to be effec-
tive. Melvin Eisenberg would permit shareholders together holding 
more than five percent of a firm's stock to nominate directors in the 
firm's proxy statement. 152 Victor Brudney and Martin Lipton would 
grant large shareholders as well as the incumbent board corporate 
funds for proxy solicitations.153 These reforms might be beneficial, but 
they would not reunite ownership and control. Large shareholders 
would have to openly oppose management, a step they shun for many 
reasons. 154 More important, it would not alter the Wall Street Rule: 
vote with management or sell. Perhaps if we were starting with a clean 
slate these proposals would suffice. Currently, however, the advantages 
of incumbency permit management-dominated boards to retain control 
indefinitely. If large shareholders did solicit proxies, corporations' cost 
of subsidizing all sides in the ensuing proxy fights would be substantial; 
the benefits would be much less certain. 155 
!49. See supra note !25. 
!50. The efforts of committee members may enhance a particular investment and also 
generate knowledge useful for other investments. If these benefits do not elicit sufficient involve-
ment by committee members, however, provision might be made for corporate payment of certain 
of the members' expenses. 
!51. See infra notes 226-30. 
!52. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at !!7-20. 
!53. Brudney, supra note !44, at 284-85; Lipton, supra note 110, at 67-69. 
!54. See supra text accompanying notes !22-38. 
!55. One danger is that large shareholders could extort greenmail from corporations by 
threatening to wage expensive proxy battles unless they were paid. Similar tactics have succeeded 
under Rule l4a-8; shareholders have extracted corporate concessions by threatening to submit 
shareholder proposals under the rule unless their demands are met. See Dent, supra note 77, at 21-
22. 
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Louis Lowenstein would have a few directorships, perhaps a quar-
ter, elected by shareholders without management interference. To en-
sure shareholders a real choice, twice as many nominees as director-
ships would be listed on the corporation's proxy form. Candidates 
nominated by holders of the most shares would appear on the ballot. 156 
Lowenstein's proposal would improve corporate governance, but 
would not fully resolve the problem of separation of ownership and 
control. First, management neutrality would be hard to enforce. Even if 
management could not overtly support candidates, it would be pre-
sumed to back shareholders' candidates with which it has close ties, 
such as employee stock option plans with trustees appointed by man-
agement. Management could punish shareholders who opposed these 
candidates as it does now. 157 Second, requiring ballots with twice as 
many nominees as board seats would compel shareholders to fight 
among themselves. This seems perverse, given that the shareholders' 
impotence springs from an inability to cooperate. Shareholders would 
still shrink from voting against management-favored candidates and, 
even more so, from nominating vigorous, competent outside directors. 
Even if the Eisen berg, Brudney, Lipton or Lowenstein proposals 
made outside directors more numerous, they would not make them 
more effective. Past efforts to influence corporate governance by ap-
pointing a minority of directors have failed. Where government or la-
bor unions choose some directors, managements co-opt them. Co-opta-
tion is eased by the minority's tendency to mimic the majority; minority 
directors usually wind up indistinguishable from the majority. 158 Co-
optation is especially likely because shareholders could not easily re-
place ineffective directors. If the minority did stubbornly persist in inde-
pendence, the majority would treat them as spies and exclude them 
from serious discussions. 159 The majority's collaboration with manage-
ment facilitates this. Management controls the flow of information to 
the board, and can selectively withhold information from an obstreper-
ous minority. Management directors and their allies can meet infor-
mally to work out any problems and then present a united front at 
board meetings. This is not far different from what happens now. Thus, 
shareholder-elected directors would not be very effective. 
156. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 209-18. Although Lowenstein criticizes institu-
tional investors for myopia, he recognizes that if they had a greater voice in corporations they 
might show more interest in them. Jd. at 213. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 127-31. 
158. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 223-25. The tendency may spring from 
the majority's superior knowledge of and information about the firm and the pressures of 
groupthink. 
159. Jd. This can be done by vesting most of the board's authority in an executive com-
mittee from which uncooperative directors are excluded. 
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Lowenstein's proposal is also troubling on a theoretical level. If 
shareholders own the firm, why should they select only a quarter of the 
board? And if a quarter of the directors are selected to represent share-
holders, whom do the other three-quarters represent? Granted, Lowen-
stein's proposal would improve upon the status quo. However, the im-
provement would be marginal because it does not eliminate the 
separation of ownership and control. The proposal resigns itself to sep-
aration, and merely seeks to smooth some of its rougher edges. 
The states are unlikely to adopt the reform proposed here. State 
corporation laws have generally been enlightened; however, they some-
times go astray, especially in the realm of takeover defenses. Corporate 
managers have used their power to choose the state of incorporation to 
bludgeon state legislatures into enacting laws that entrench managers 
to the detriment of shareholders. 160 At the federal level, this will not 
work. Managers are better positioned to lobby state legislatures than 
are investors, who have little local political influence and whose lobby-
ing efforts face the same collective action problems, legal obstacles, and 
management hostility that hamper their proxy voting. 161 
Investors have a better cl;lance at making themselves heard at the 
federal level. The federal government has long regulated proxies, so es-
tablishing shareholder proxy committees would not swerve far from 
traditional federal domain. Indeed, by resolving the conflict between 
investors and managers arising from the separation of ownership and 
control, the proposal would facilitate a true market for incorporation, 
or race to the top, among the states. Each state would try to devise the 
corporate law that best reduces transaction costs and enhances firm val-
ues. Unlike federal incorporation, this proposal leaves corporate law, 
including takeover defenses, to the states. The proposal does not con-
tradict the deregulation movement. Although it would establish a fed-
eral rule, that rule would require very little bureaucratic enforcement. 
Ideally, Congress would enact reform by amending the securities 
laws, with the SEC having rule-making powers to supply details. How-
ever, the SEC may already be able to give shareholders some control of 
the proxy machinery. Despite some criticism, 162 the SEC has long re-
160. Romano, The Polilical Economy of Takeover S!a/ules, 73 VA. L. REV. Ill (1987). 
See supra note 117. The Supreme Court has vacillated on whether these laws are unconstitutional 
burdens on interstate commerce or are preempted by federal securities laws. Compare CTS Corp. 
v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding Indiana law) wilh Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down an Illinois statute). 
161. The one state where investors might have a sufficient stake to warrant a struggle is 
Delaware because so many public companies are incorporated there. Interestingly, Delaware has 
not been a leader in anti-takeover legislation, but a follower, usually with milder legislation than 
other states. 
162. Dent, supra note 77, at 6-28 (arguing that the SEC lacks authority to adopt the 
shareholder proposal rule). 
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quired public firms to include shareholder proposals in proxy state-
ments. 163 If the SEC has the power to do this, it can also require corpo-
rations to· pay for proxy solicitations by a committee of the largest 
shareholders. 164 Although the SEC probably cannot forbid corpora-
tions from paying for incumbent boards' proxy solicitations, it can re-
quire disclosures that stress an incumbent board's domination by man-
agement. This would help offset the board's advantage of incumbency. 
B. Benefits of Shareholder Control 
In most respects, shareholder control will probably not change 
corporate behavior much; most corporations are reasonably well man-
aged and would continue to be so. Shareholder control would generate 
many small changes in public companies and in some cases would pro-
duce major changes. 
Shareholder control would result in executive compensation tied 
more tightly to corporate performance than to growth. 165 Shareholder 
control will not diminish direct executive compensation and may even 
increase it, but it will reduce executive perquisites, including large 
staffs. 166 
Shareholder control would also influence executive hiring and re-
tention. Cronyism, nepotism and incompetence in public firms may not 
be widespread, but they exist in some cases. Shareholder directors 
would have strong incentives to end these practices which diminish the 
value of the firm and its stock. Takeovers can oust incompetent manag-
ers, but boards could perform this task better because they can remove 
officers more easily. Boards do not face takeover defenses and enjoy 
better access to information than raiders, so they can monitor better 
and act more quickly. 167 At the same time, shareholders have incen-
tives to retain good managers. 
Managers would continue to lead in fashioning corporate strategy 
because they devote full time to the firm and are more expert than 
outside directors; there is generally no reason to hire an executive for a 
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1989). 
164. One justification for Rule 14a-8 is that shareholders want to know about motions to 
be submitted at shareholder meetings. Dent, supra note 77, at 6-8. The meager support given to 
shareholder proposals belies this argument. Director nominations by a committee of large share-
holders will command tremendous interest, however, as indicated by the wide support for share-
holder initiatives against management's anti-takeover efforts. See supra notes I 39-42. 
165. One study found that in public corporations, CEOs earned an extra $.02 for every 
$1,000 gained in firm market value and returns. In post-leveraged buyout companies, the compa-
rable figure was $64. Passell, Executive Pay: Is It Too High?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at 02, col. 
I. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at I I 72 n.3 I (stock options do not reduce mana-
gerial discretion). 
166. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
167. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 46, at 145-48. 
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job unless he can do it better than the board. However, directors would 
have an incentive to review corporate plans. In particular, they would 
curb management's preference for growth over firm value and its aver-
sion to risk; shareholders are generally risk-neutral. New projects 
would be undertaken only if they promised a market rate of return or 
better. 
Shareholder control would transform corporate finance by reduc-
ing retention of earnings and increasing payouts. 168 Payouts could 
even exceed earnings, with the shortfall made up by debt because share-
holders do not share the managers' abhorrence of debt. However, divi-
dends would not be needed to assure that shareholders will not be 
cheated since the shareholders will controJ.l 69 Shareholder control 
would end such wasteful practices as using accounting methods that 
increase taxes and reported earnings without affecting real earnings. 170 
Investor control would curtail unprofitable acquisitions and spur 
deconglomeration, which has greatly profited shareholders. 171 In gen-
eral, shareholder control should improve profitability. 172 
At the same time, shareholder control could help revive public 
equity financing. Stock markets often price equity far below fundamen-
tal value because of uninformed trading and fears that management-
controlled public companies will waste earnings. 173 The discounting of 
publicly traded shares inflates the cost of public equity financing. By 
eliminating discounts, shareholder control could make public stock a 
more attractive investment and financing vehicle. This could spur 
greater use of public stock offerings and stem the tide of going-private 
transactions, which are often attractive only because separation of 
ownership and control makes equity financing undesirable. 174 
The greatest immediate effect of shareholder control would be in 
the realm of takeovers. Although commentators disagree about many 
aspects of takeovers, nearly all agree on two points. First, takeover de-
168. Some commentators have urged policies to increase payouts in order to curb mana-
gerial discretion. M. Fox, FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 335-
39 (1987). See supra note 49. 
169. See supra note 49. 
170. Investor-controlled companies rarely engage in these practices. See supra note 48. 
171. Coffee, supra note 12, at 55. Managers in control make unprofitable acquisitions, 
often of a conglomerate kind, in pursuit of growth rather than profits. See supra note 52. 
172. Profitability is highest at moderate levels of share ownership by the board. Morek, 
Shleifer & Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. 
FIN. EcoN. 293 (1988). 
173. See supra notes 49-52; infra notes 221-22. 
174. Institutional investors are increasingly avoiding investments in publicly traded 
stock. See infra note 208. [t is not inconsistent to predict an increase in both debt and equity 
financing. Management-controlled companies now finance primarily with retained earnings. See 
supra notes 30 & 50. By diminishing earnings retention, shareholder control might increase both 
debt and equity financing. 
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fenses often severely damage targets and potential targets. 175 Second, 
shareholders can be victimized by some raiding tactics; the same collec-
tive action problems that hinder them in voting prevent them from co-
ordinating their responses to the raider. Shareholder control would 
eliminate both problems. Shareholders would support takeover de-
fenses that would fetch a higher price for the firm. This would counter 
both the entrenchment of managers and plundering by raiders. Further, 
the proxy committee would help shareholders to coordinate their re-
sponses to takeover bids. This would prevent raiders from stampeding 
shareholders into selling at a suboptimal price. 
Consider, for example, the most common takeover defense, the 
poison pill. Most institutional investors dislike poison pills because 
they reduce the value of a firm's common stock. 176 Managers defend 
poison pills on the ground that they enable management to negotiate 
with the raider and others to make sure that shareholders receive a fair 
price. 1 77 Given the shareholders' collective action problem, this defense 
is not a priori implausible. However, the negative effect of adopting 
poison pills on share prices shows that investors do not trust managers 
to negotiate for the best interests of the shareholders. With the largest 
shareholders in control, poison pills might be unnecessary; the mem-
bers of the proxy committee could coordinate their responses to a bid, 
and because they own so much stock, 178 a raider might find it difficult 
to gain control if they did not tender their shares. If poison pills were 
still desired to permit the target to negotiate for better offers, poison 
pills would enhance share values; investors would trust directors se-
lected by a proxy committee to yield the pill for the shareholders' bene-
fit because the members of the committee are themselves shareholders 
and have the same interests as other shareholders. 
At the same time, a shareholder-controlled board could negotiate 
contracts to protect managers from the personal dangers that often 
cause them to resist takeovers. 179 More important, shareholder control 
could obviate most takeovers. Takeovers serve to close the gap between 
a firm's stock market price and fundamental value thatarises from fears 
I 75. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, UPDATE-
THE EFFECTS OF DUAL-CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: INCLUDING Evi-
DENCE FROM 1986 AND 1987 at 8 (July 16, 1987) ("we find significant and negative abnormal stock 
returns at the announcement of the dual-class recapitalization"); OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EcoNOMIST, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OFT ARGET 
SHAREHOLDERS 5 (Oct. 23, 1986) ("poison pill adoptions reduce stock prices"). 
I 76. See supra note I 75. 
177. Lipton, supra note I 10, at 30-31. 
I 78. See supra note 148. 
179. Coffee, supra note 12, at 9, 24, 73 (takeovers violate implicit employment contracts 
providing managers with security and deferred compensation). 
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of misinvestment by management or from uninformed trading. 180 
Shareholder control would calm fears of misinvestment and discourage 
uninformed trading, 181 and thereby help limit tender offers to situa-
tions where they can produce synergy. 
The most important long-range effect of shareholder control, how-
ever, would be to rationalize corporate governance, beginning with the 
role and structure of the board. Theorists speculate, for example, 
whether boards should include members of management or directors 
who are knowledgeable about one aspect of a firm's business but not 
about the industry generally. 182 Similarly, they disagree about the opti-
mal size of the board, 183 the role of board committees, and the size and 
form of compensation for outside directors. 184 
A principal problem for the monitoring model, the ALI Project 
and all other reform efforts focusing on outside directors, is to define 
the role of outside directors. As Bayless Manning has said, "We do not 
know what the directors are supposed to do; we know only that they are 
supposed to do it 'with care.' " 185 Those who can best decide what di-
rectors should do are those who will be most affected by their actions; 
that is, the shareholders. They now have little reason to ponder the 
question because they play no role in the selection of directors. Only 
when shareholders control the board will they start to figure out how 
180. See infra notes 221-24. 
181. By increasing payouts and by working against discounts of stock prices from funda-
mental value, controlling shareholders would reward intelligent investing. Uninformed trading, or 
speculation, is encouraged by erratic share price changes arising from uncertainty about future 
payouts. By reducing that uncertainty, shareholder control would discourage speculation. 
182. Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams argued that a board should include only 
one manager, the CEO, who should not be the board chairman. Address by Harold M. Williams, 
Fairless Lecture, Carnegie-Mellon University (Oct. 24, 1979). Even investor-controlled compa-
nies, however, usually include several officers on the board. Williamson, Corporate Ga1•ernance, 93 
YALE L.J. 1197, 1220 (1984) (giving reasons for management representation on boards). Many 
companies now have directors with specialized skills, but some commentators criticizt! this devel-
opment. E.g., Manning, supra note 96, at 1482-83 (specialized directors with non-business back-
grounds "are often not knowledgeable about many matters that come up on the board's agenda"). 
183. Patton & Baker, supra note 90, at 12 (arguing that current boards are too large to be 
effective). 
184. For example, incentive compensation was traditionally denied to outside directors 
on the theory that they do not affect corporate performance. See supra note 99. However, a grow-
ing number of firms now grant outside directors incentive compensation. Schleifer & Vishny, 
Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 7 (1988). Shareholders in con-
trol would have strong incentives to solve these puzzles. 
185. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overviel!', 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 620-21 
(1984). See also C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 5 (1976) ('"A well-known 
corporate officer recently observed in public discussion, 'Most boards of directors I have been on 
don't know exactly what they are supposed to do.'"); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 141 ( 1975) 
("there is almost no authoritative guide as to what, exactly, the directors are supposed to be do-
ing"); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 
1799, 1803 ( 1976) ("The confusion as to the role and responsibility of the corporate director has 
precipitated serious debate."). 
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much time outside directors should devote to their positions, how ac-
tively they should participate in corporate planning, how to handle ex-
ecutive compensation, takeover defenses, and all the other problems 
that have long plagued corporate governance. 
Improving corporate governance would improve corporate law, 
including fiduciary duties. 186 With shareholders in control, it might be 
possible to restrict or eliminate derivative suits. Such suits have always 
been problematic to corporate law, and, like tender offers, are a re-
sponse to the collective action problem. 187 Removing the collective ac-
tion problem might obviate the need for derivative suits. 
C. Possible Objections 
A number of objections to the proposal may be raised. First, or-
ganization is oligarchy. 188 Would a shareholder proxy committee serve 
its own interests rather than those of all shareholders? Fiduciary obliga-
tions would easily extend to the functions of committee members. More 
important, opportunities for committee members to line their pockets 
would be extremely limited. The law generally forbids discrimination 
among shareholders. 189 Large shareholders could not, for example, 
cause a dividend to be paid only on their shares. Thus, by law, share-
holders' interests largely coincide. 190 Empirical evidence confirms this 
identity ofinterests. 191 
186. It is not clear whether shareholder control should affect the directors' and officers' 
duty of care. Because shareholders would have better control over directors, it might make sense to 
relax legal intrusion by lowering the standard of care. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 
795, 835 (1983) (the law should regulate less where beneficiaries have greater control of fiduci-
aries). But perhaps a higher duty of care would be justified on the theory that more could and 
should be expected of outside directors who are really selected by shareholders. 
187. Clark, supra note 78, at 780-85. Nearly all derivative suits are brought against man-
agers. Derivative suits are permitted on the theory that many boards are not independent of man-
agement and cannot be trusted to enforce the managers' fiduciary duties. Derivative suits face 
many restrictions, however, on the theory that the board generally controls the corporation and 
that individual shareholder plaintiffs cannot be trusted to litigate in the best interest of the 
company. 
188. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15 (1962). 
189. II W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 5352 (rev. 
ed. 1958) (rule of equal treatment); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 651-52 (directors 
and officers may not "favor one intracorporate group to the detriment of another"). 
190. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 405-06; II W. FLETCHER, supra note 189, at 
§ 5352. Although differing investor in!t:rests and preferences cim create coordination problems 
among shareholders, these problems tend to be small in public corporations with no dominant 
shareholder. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums and 
Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. I, 21 (1987). 
191. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 18, at 407, cite studies showing that when a 
shareholder accumulates a large bloc of stock, the firm's share price rises. They argue persuasively 
that this shows that large shareholders do not threaten to exploit the small; rather, the existence of 
large shareholders reduces the collective action problem, the principal obstacle to shareholder 
influence. See also infra note 226. 
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The law also circumscribes dealings of fiduciaries with the firm. 
Occasions for self-dealing by proxy committee members would be rarer 
and more easily policed than the current opportunities of executives for 
self-dealing; most institutional investors simply do not have the kinds 
of businesses that would lend themselves to self-dealing. 192 Some 
shareholders may be less diversified than the largest shareholders. It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that the undiversified sharehold-
ers will be more risk-averse; if they are undiversified, they probably 
want some additional risk. 
Committee members might also enjoy opportunities for insider 
trading. Although insider trading is not an overriding evil, it is a cause 
for concern. 193 Selection of directors by institutional investors, how-
ever, would not materially increase insider trading. Inside information 
is confided to directors only a few days each year; they and their affili-
ates can refrain, or be prohibited, from trading at those times. Institu-
tional investors can also be screened from the directors' inside informa-
tion by a Chinese Wall or by the selection of directors with no 
institutional affiliations. 194 Additional steps may be needed to police 
insider trading and insiders may still realize some benefits, but these 
constitute a small price for better corporate governance. 
A related concern is that the institutions' diverse investments could 
lead to conflicts of interest when they participate in corporate govern-
ance. An institution with interests in a supplier and a customer, for 
example, might try to influence the one in which it has a smaller stake to 
grant sweetheart deals to the one in which it has a larger interest. Cor-
porate law already forbids controlling shareholders from abusing con-
trol this way. 195 More important, temptations and opportunities to ex-
192. Some institutional investors, such as commercial banks and investment banks, deal 
with industrial firms in ways (such as lending and securities underwriting) that might invite abuse. 
However, these investors would probably be too few on most shareholder committees to exert 
much influence. Whatever influence they enjoyed, moreover, would be remote from the firm's 
operational decisions and subject to existing law on related party transactions. Nonetheless, fur-
ther regulation of these special situations might be desirable. 
193. R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 265-77. But see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 26. However, most advanced countries per-
mit insider trading. E.g., Kallfass, The German Experience, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 775, 781 
(within limits, insider trading is legal in West Germany). Insider trading is sometimes lauded as 
appropriate compensation for insiders and the same argument could be made for shareholder 
committee members. If some compensation is needed to elicit their diligence, however, it would be 
better to make the compensation overt. Carlton & Fischel, supra. 
194. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 62; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 215-16. "Chi-
nese Wall" is a term used for the technique of isolating confidential information held by one part 
of a firm from the other parts. Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Co11flict Problems 
of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 461-62 (1975). 
195. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, 637-44. 
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ert such influences would be rare. 196 Antitrust concerns could be 
handled by existing laws against interlocking directorates. 197 
Fear of conflicts of interest should not paralyze efforts to improve 
corporate governance. The American fixation with conflicts of interest 
is understandable but can be counterproductive. Japanese and conti-
nental systems tolerate and even encourage influence for such institu-
tions as lending banks and other firms with which a company does busi-
ness. 198 Any damage from the conflicts of interest in these relationships 
is deemed outweighed by the benefits. Indeed, Japanese and some Euro-
pean languages have no term for conflict of interest. 199 We should not 
ignore conflicts of interest, but neither should we be obsessed with 
them. Moreover, we should consider the problem of conflicts of interest 
not in the abstract, but in comparison to other possible approaches: 
institutional investors may have some conflicts of interest, but they pale 
in comparison with those of the executives who now dominate public 
firms. 200 
A second possible objection is that shareholder control could ex-
pose management to mistreatment. For example, shareholders might 
risk bankruptcy (and in turn the managers' jobs) by excessive borrow-
ing or might cheat managers of expected compensation by suddenly 
selling the firm. The experience of investor-controlled firms, however, 
shows that managers can protect themselves and may even fare better 
than they do under management control. Direct management compen-
sation tends to be higher in investor-controlled than in management-
controlled firms. 201 Managers of investor-controlled firms usually hold 
more firm stock, which further balances the greater risks shareholders 
might impose. Where investors control, it is easier to negotiate a con-
tract to cushion the blow of bankruptcy or sale of the firm or to provide 
expressly for deferred compensation; in management-controlled com-
panies, these bargains are often left to "golden parachutes" because of 
196. See supra text accompanying note 192. 
197. Clayton Act,§ 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988) ("No person at the same time shall be a 
director in any two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided 
profits aggregating more than $1,000,000 ... if such corporations are or shall have been thereto-
fore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of 
competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of 
any of the antitrust laws."). 
198. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 192, 212-14; Kallfass, supra note 193, at 783-84. 
See also infra note 212 (interlock among Japanese companies). 
199. Mikuni, Our Financial System and the Role of Shareholders (address), Columbia 
Conference, supra note 39. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59 (divergent interests of managers and 
shareholders). 
201. W. McEACHERN, supra note 44, at 65-66, 80, 87. 
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problems of self-dealing and publicity. 202 Incompetent managers may 
not fare well, but this is no cause for concern. 
A third objection flows from the neoclassical economists' view of 
corporate governance: if the proposal were beneficial, it would already 
have been adopted by public companies. 203 This view recalls the joke 
about a finance professor walking with a student who sees a twenty-
dollar bill; the student asks the professor if he should pick it up. "Of 
course not," the professor replies, "if it really were there, someone 
would already have picked it up." 204 Someone must be the first. Only 
gradually has the nature of the corporate governance problem come 
into focus. 205 Moreover, changing conditions now demonstrate that 
larger investors have fewer conflicts of interest and fewer opportunities 
for self-dealing than the individuals and families who once figured more 
prominently among major shareholders. 206 Among large institutional 
shareholders, fewer are now commercial or investment banks that 
might also have conflicts of interest. Institutional investors have also 
become more interested in working to keep portfolio firms on, or return 
them to, the right track, rather than following the Wall Street Rule of 
voting with management or selling. 207 
Shareholder control has also failed to evolve for want of mecha-
nisms to effect change. Institutional investors could pursue shareholder 
control through charter amendments, but this would require a lengthy, 
expensive firm-by-firm campaign. More important, it would require re-
sort to the proxy mechanism, which is the root of the problem; if the 
proxy system already worked for shareholders, it would not need re-
form. Moreover, shareholder control has increased, albeit only in spe-
cial cases where evolution was possible. In the growing field of venture 
202. Coffee, supra note 12, at 9, 24, 73-8 I (discussing implicit contracts for deferred man-
agement compensation). Deferred compensation contracts may have been left implicit in the past 
because the threat of shareholders' reneging by selling the firm was so remote. Because of the 
growth of takeovers, more firms have now adopted explicit contracts which provide payments for 
managers ousted in takeovers. However, these have attracted unfavorable publicity and lawsuits. 
/d. at 77. 
203. See supra note 18. 
204. This joke appears in Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, I 53 LLOYDS 
BANK REV. I, 2 (1984). 
205. For example, commentators long misunderstood the collective action problem and 
thought shareholders were inactive only because they lacked information. F. EMERSON & F. 
LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 3-16 (!954). 
Some commentators still deny that any corporate governance problem exists. See supra notes I 7-
20. 
206. See supra note I 92 and accompanying text (institutional investors have few opportu-
nities for self-dealing). 
207. See infra notes 225-30. 
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capital financing, investors typically demand . a hand in control. 208 
Tender offers seek to replace management control with owner control. 
Management buyouts also unite ownership and control, not by giving 
control to the shareholders, but by selling ownership to the controlling 
managers. Even where corporations remain public, institutional inves-
tors are asserting themselves more in corporate governance. 209 The 
popularity of these means for uniting ownership and control suggests 
that, despite the neoclassicists' claims, all is not weii in corporate 
governance. 
Although the proposal would add another layer to already com-
plex corporate bureaucracies, the costs to the corporation would be 
small. The costs to the proxy committee members would not be 
great. 210 Newly fashioned boards would be more expensive only if in-
vestors decided to get better qualified directors and demand more work 
from them. These costs would be far outweighed not only by enhanced 
profits, but also by the reduced costs to aii investors of monitoring the 
firm's managers. 
The most serious objection to the shareholder proxy committee 
proposal is that shareholders, especially the institutions who would 
dominate shareholder committees, are obsessed with short-term profits. 
In this view, investors care only about the firm's market value; the stock 
market, in turn, is fixated with short-term considerations, such as quar-
terly earnings, and not with the fundamental value of the firm. 211 The 
officers, however, take an appropriately long-range view. Proponents of 
this view often compare American corporations unfavorably with Jap-
anese firms which, they believe, take a commendably longer-range view 
of investment because they are free from shareholder influences. 212 Al-
though shareholders could not easily transmit myopia to the board and 
208. See infra note 227; Longstreth, Corporate Governance, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at 5, 
col. I ("Institutional investors are increasingly turning to non-public investments" which "more 
completely align the interests of management with the interests of ownership."). 
209. For example, Texaco recently agreed to add to its board a director suggested by the 
California Public Employees Retirement System. Triumph at Texaco: Shareholders' candidate 
placed on the board, Issue Alert, Feb. 1989, at I (newsletter published by Institutional Shareholder 
Services, Iric.). 
210. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
211. L. LowENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 56-87; Lipton, supra note II 0, at 7-8; Reich, supra 
note 60, at 36. 
212. Japan's system of"interlock," in which most stock in industrial companies is held by 
banks and other firms with which the company does business, has produced stable shareholders 
and "has helped achieve a virtual independence between the management and the shareholders." 
Kurokawa (address), Columbia Conference, supra note 39, at 5. This independence facilitates 
long-term planning. !d. at 8. See also Kallfass, supra note 193, at 786 (interlocking corporate share 
ownership in West Germany). 
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management under this proposal, 213 the fear of short-sightedness war-
rants attention. 
Managers sometimes take a longer-term view of corporate activi-
ties than do shareholders, but their perspective is not necessarily supe-
rior. Managers prefer to retain and reinvest earnings even if the return 
on investment is lower than the prevailing market rate; shareholders 
prefer that earnings be paid out unless they can be reinvested at a rate of· 
return exceeding those on other investment opportunities. 214 If we ac-
cept the premises of a market economy, the shareholders are right. Jap-
anese companies take a longer perspective than American, but only be-
cause Japanese market conditions are different. The cost of capital in 
America far exceeds that of Japan; projects that are sufficiently profita-
ble for them are not for us. 215 
Even apart from the different costs of capital, comparisons be-
tween American and Japanese corporations are hazardous because of 
the tremendous cultural differences between the two countries. 216 To 
ascribe Japanese success to managerial independence seems far fetched. 
Given the substantial freedom of American managers from investors 
and the investor pressures on Japanese managers, 217 it is not even clear 
that Japanese managers enjoy greater freedom than American manag-
ers. Moreover, the Japanese situation may be changing, with investors 
obtaining more influence and demanding higher returns, as evidenced 
by the flight of Japanese capital to the United States. In short, Japanese 
capital markets may be becoming more like ours. 218 The higher returns 
commanded by American investors may be economically undesirable; 
213. Under the proposal, the committee is limited to meeting once a year to nominate 
candidates for the board. Shareholders who sell out quickly cannot influence even their own 
nominees. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
215. "The cost of capital in Japan in real terms is about one-third of that in the United 
States." Corporate Debt: Is It Riskier in U.S.?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at 01, coL 3 (quoting 
George Hatsopoulos, senior lecturer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Accord Farrell, 
Why Junk in the First Place? Skimpy Savings, Bus. WK., Sept. II, 1989, at 92 (citing a study by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York). 
216. This is not an appropriate forum to discuss their differences, but a few of them can be 
noted. "Theory Z" ascribes Japanese success to teamwork. W. OUCH!, THEORY Z ( 1981). If true, is 
this a product of Japanese corporate law or cultural attitudes? Theory Z may not even be true. 
Some claim that Japanese managerial success springs from fear instilled by intolerance for failure. 
Kotkin & Mishimoto, Theory F, INC., April 1986, at 53. Japanese business success also owes much 
to the famed appetite of managers and employees for work, but this, too, is induced by culture, not 
by corporate law. 
217. Because of the system of "interlock," see supra note 212, Japanese managers need 
not worry about takeovers and daily stock prices. Interlocking shareholders insist on managerial 
competence and integrity, however, and may work to remove ineffective managers. Mikuni, supra 
note 199, at 7 (if a company is mismanaged, banks can demand change in management). See also 
L LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 212 (in West Germany, merchant bank shareholders step in if 
management is weak). 
218. Mikuni, supra note 199, at 9; Kurokawa, supra note 212, at 8-10. 
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they discourage projects that could create employment and help Ameri-
can companies compete internationally. If America's higher cost of 
capital is a problem, however, it should be attacked by encouraging 
Americans to save and invest rather than by conceding managers' 
broad discretion with but a "pious wish" that they use it wisely. 219 
It could be argued that the proxy committee proposal will give 
control to myopic shareholders who want more than competitive rates 
of return. If, for example, shareholders only care about quarterly earn-
ings, their already weak influence should not be enhanced, but elimi-
nated. However, even investors who trade rapidly are probably not so 
irrational. Investors are not fooled by changes in earnings that reflect 
only quirks or changes in accounting, and stock prices tend to respond 
favorably to capital expenditures. 220 True, shares often trade at prices 
far lower than experts consider to be a firm's fundamental value. Strug-
gling to explain this phenomenon, commentators advance two theories. 
One is the misinvestment theory. To investors, shares are worth only 
the income they will produce in future payouts, discounted to present 
value. If the firm pays low dividends and is insulated from hostile take-
over by poison pills and other defenses, the value of the shares depends 
primarily on the hope that the entrenched managers will voluntarily 
raise dividends or permit the company to be taken over. This is true 
even though the firm has and promises to maintain strong, steadily 
growing earnings. 221 Given manager opposition to payouts and take-
overs, stock prices simply reflect the realistic expectation of investors 
that they may never receive the fundamental value of their shares. 222 
219. See supra note 62. The relative reluctance of Americans to save stems in part from 
tax policies that encourage spending (for example, tax deductions for interest on debt) and from 
the absence of tax policies, used by Japan and other countries, to encourage saving (for example, 
tax exemptions for interest on savings). The reluctance also stems in part from social attitudes 
about thrift and consumption. Thus, Japanese policies would not necessarily produce the same 
results here. 
220. Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 69 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988); McConnell & 
Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expendilllre Decisions and the Market Value a/the Firm, 14 J. FIN. 
EcoN. 399,416 (1985) (announced increases (decreases) in capital expenditures correlate with sig-
nificant positive (negative) stock price changes). Accord Pound, Lehn & Jarrell, Are tender Offers 
Hostile to Economic Performance?, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 25, 55. 
221. Berle and Means recognized that the value of shares depends on the expectation of 
payouts, but that the shareholders' right to payouts is ephemeral. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra 
note I, at 287. 
222. Black, supra note 41, at 612-13 (investors discount the shares of certain firms because 
they expect the firms' retained earnings to be wasted); Kraakman, supra note 34, at 897-99. The 
shareholders' problem is underscored by the difficulty of even defining "fundamental value." One 
possible meaning is the price that the firm would fetch in an auction. This measure may be inap-
propriate because that price may be inflated by the tax benefits available to a purchaser (but not to 
incumbent management). Lipton, supra note I 10, at 9-10. The price may also be increased by the 
synergy from merging the firm into the acquirer and by the willingness of many buyers to overpay. 
Dent, supra note 36, at 778-80. Another possible meaning is the present value of the firm's expected 
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A second theory argues that speculative, uninformed trading 
drives stock prices below fundamental value. 223 This theory has been 
questioned, 224 but even if it is valid, it does not follow that vesting con-
trol of the proxy mechanism in a committee of large shareholders 
would damage corporate performance. Institutions in many foreign 
countries, including Sweden, West Germany and Japan, play a large 
role on corporate boards and their influence is generally considered be-
nign. 225 American experience also confirms the desirability of share-
holder influence: corporations in which a few shareholders own enough 
stock to exert influence generally outperform firms that are manage-
ment controlled. 226 Similarly, many institutions make venture capital 
investments in which they assume a prominent role-typically half of 
the seats-on the portfolio firm's board. These institutions willingly 
take a long-term view of the firm; indeed, that is one reason why man-
agers often turn to venture capitalists and other institutions for equity 
financing. 227 In general, those who have an effective voice in an organ-
ization are less likely to exit from it. 228 Thus, shareholders who have an 
effective voice are less likely to follow the Wall Street Rule and sell 
when unhappy, but rather to exercise their voice in an effort to improve 
the firm. 
Through leveraged buyouts, many institutions become controlling 
shareholders or part of the control group of industrial companies. Far 
from damaging these companies, investor control "eliminates manag-
ers' obsession with quarterly earnings and the bad habits that it cre-
ates. " 229 The institutions are not an oddball few; several prestigious 
future earnings. That figure may depend greatly on whether one expects management to reinvest 
earnings at below-market rates of return. See supra note 51. 
223. Kraakman, supra note 34, at 899-901. Cf Wang, supra note 34. 
224. Kraakman, supra note 34, at 939-41. 
225. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 192, 212-14; Kallfass, supra note 193, at 790 (in 
West Germany, active institutional investors do not think short-term). 
226. Schleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. PoL. EcoN. 
461, 465-71 (1986) (presence of large non management shareholders benefits small shareholders); 
Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (1989) ("announce-
ment of a private sale (of equity] is associated with a 4.5% increase in non-participating share-
holder wealth"). Cf E. HERMAN, supra note 91, at 107-13 (superior performance of owner-domi-
nated firms may be due to factors other than failure to maximize profits in management-
dominated firms). But see Stigler & Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berte and 
Means, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 237, 259 (1983) (practices in management-dominated firms don't differ 
from those in owner-dominated companies). 
227. Jereski, Enter the 'Core' Investor-To Cheers and Boos, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1989, at 
104 (more U.S. firms are raising capital from a single large equity investor). 
228. A. HIRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 37 (1970). 
229. Power Investors Call the Shots, Bus. WK., June 20, 1988, at 126, 127. The ""bad 
habits" include accounting methods that inflate taxes and reported earnings without improving 
actual financial performance. See supra note 48. As evidence of their long-term commitment, insti-
tutional investors sometimes increase the capital budgets of the controlled firms. While Shoes and 
Blue Collars and Morgan Stanley, Bus. WK., June 20, 1988, at 122; Progress !sn 't Drml'lling in 
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investment banks have created buyout funds and have persuaded many 
domestic and foreign pension funds and commercial banks to invest. 230 
These developments show that institutional investors are not in-
herently irrational and short-sighted. Their short-term focus, if it exists 
at all, results from their impotence in management-controlled firms and 
vanishes in leveraged buyouts and venture capital situations where they 
have some influence. Thus, the problems of investor myopia and of 
stock prices that bear no resemblance to fundamental value cannot be 
solved by keeping shareholders powerless. The solution is to give share-
holders the control that, in theory, they should already possess as own-
ers of the firm. The value of their shares can then be brought into line 
with the fundamental value of the firm. 
In sum, the possible criticisms of the proposal, although enlighten-
ing, carry little force. Still, if the criticisms carry any weight at all, why 
change? In this regard, we should beware the nirvana fallacy, under 
which any actual or proposed state of affairs must be rejected if it is not 
perfect. Shareholder control of corporate boards cannot be perfect any 
more than any other human institution can be. The proper comparison 
is not with perfection, but with the current system of management con-
trol. The current corporate governance system has major shortcomings. 
The proxy committee proposal promises major improvements. 231 Its 
defects are, by comparison, slight. 
V. CONCLUSION 
More than fifty years ago, Berle and Means established the separa-
tion of ownership and control in the large public firm as the central 
problem of corporate law. It remains so today. By controlling the proxy 
system, managers have broken free of accountability to the owners of 
the business: the shareholders. The corporate governance debate has 
lost sight of this problem, however, and has become bogged down in an 
intellectual trench war over the monitoring model and the ALI Corpo-
rate Governance Project. The monitoring model and the ALI Project 
have some merits; nonetheless, even their supporters admit that they 
would not improve corporate governance greatly. The'ir key shortcom-
ing is that they fail to resolve the separation of ownership and control. 
Corporate governance scholarship needs to abandon the current 
sterile debate and grapple with the problem posed by Berle and Means. 
Some aspects of a new approach seem clear; shareholders must acquire 
control, but collective action problems and rational shareholder apathy 
Debt- Yet, Bus. WK.: INNOVATION IN AMERICA II 0 (I 989) (data do not show that firms involved in 
mergers, buyouts, or restructurings tend to reduce research and development). 
230. Power Im•estors, supra note 229, at 116-17; White Shoes, supra note 229, at 122-23. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 165-87. 
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mean that shareholders cannot act as a town meeting, but must rely on 
institutional investors to take a leading role. This Article proposes that 
this be accomplished by granting corporate funds for proxy solicita-
tions exclusively to a committee of the largest shareholders. This ap-
proach promises to unify ownership and control and, in so doing, re-
solve many problems that have long plagued corporate law. Apart from 
the significance of the particular proposal, it is hoped that this Article 
will help to lift the corporate governance debate out of the rut in which 
it is now stuck and elevate that debate to a new and more fruitful plane. 
